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ABSTRACT 
On a day-to-day basis, “security” to most Americans means proving their identity by 
producing a valid government-issued identification document (ID)—most commonly a 
driver’s license. For this reason, terrorists on September 11, 2001, (9/11) placed high 
value on driver’s licenses as a mean to mask preparatory activities leading up to their 
attack. Congress, as a result, enacted several measures, culminating in the Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), adopted June 1, 2009. The WHTI requires all 
citizens to show proof of identity while crossing U.S. land, sea, and recently some air 
borders between Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Bermuda. To facilitate the 
initiative, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expanded on such ongoing ID 
initiatives as NEXUS, FAST, and SENTRI and adopted a number of different ID 
solutions, including passport card (PASS Card), Enhanced Driver’s License (EDL), 
Global Entry and the Enhanced Tribal Card while considering others beyond the costly 
passport to facilitate commerce, trade, and tourism with Border States. All WHTI IDs 
employ vicinity-read radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, which has raised 
privacy concerns. This thesis seeks to join the ongoing civil liberties vs. national security 
debate through a case study of the EDL on both technological and legal grounds. 
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Members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (more commonly the 9/11 Commission) found U.S. identification documents 
(IDs)—driver’s licenses, passports, birth certificates, etc.—to be critical components in 
helping the hijackers carry out the 9/11 attacks.1 In the final wrap-up, the 9/11 
investigation members were especially critical of driver’s licenses, denoting them “as 
important as weapons for terrorists,”2 based on evidence that all but one hijacker had 
obtained or had fraudulently obtained a driver’s license.3 Importantly, driver’s licenses 
allowed the 9/11 hijackers to mask activities without arousing suspicion. In fact, four of 
the hijackers were stopped by law enforcement for speeding infractions days to weeks 
before the devastating attack—and released again, not least because they possessed valid-
seeming driver’s licenses.4 
 Congress, in response to the 9/11 Commission findings, passed the 2004 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) on December 17, 2004.5 The 
act, among many organizational and procedural changes, sought to decrease the 
exploitability of driver’s licenses and thereby increase the capability of systems—law 
enforcement, Customs Border Patrol (CBP), the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), etc.—that rely on driver’s licenses to assure national security and public safety to 
identify problem driver’s licenses and, presumably, thwart terrorist machinations. The act 
also identified a need to tighten border security, as the 9/11 Commission discovered 
driver’s licenses were often used as proof of identity at border crossings. Congress,  
 
                                                 
1 Thomas Kean and others, "The 9/11 Commission Report," National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed 
September 18, 2012). 
 2 Jean Merserve and Mike Ahlers, "9/11 Commission Members Act to Finally Wrap it Up," CNN, 
http://cnn.com/2009/US/07/25/new.antiterror.group/index.html (accessed May 6, 2012). 
3 Janice L. Kephart, "Identity and Security: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Identity 
Document Security," 911securitysolutions.com, 
http://www.911securitysolutions.com/index.php?option=com_contents&task=view&id=117&Itemid=38 
(accessed April 27, 2012). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-796, (2004): 1001. 
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therefore, inserted into the IRTPA a requirement for the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, to find a solution,6 which later became the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) on June 1, 2009.7 
The Department of Homeland (DHS), tasked by the president, responded the 
driver’s license and increase border security requirements identified by the IRTPA. 
Before groundwork could begin, states and privacy groups mounted strenuous opposition 
to the act for its imposition on state and individual rights.8 In light of such concerns, 
Congress repealed Section 7212 of the IRTPA and enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 on 
May 11, 2005, which relaxed the federal mandate and clarified requirements to make 
driver’s licenses acceptable for the “official purposes” of the federal government.9 
Despite relaxing the law, REAL ID continues to receive criticism for many reasons to 
include, but limited to, its continued imposition on state and individual rights.10 In other 
words, REAL ID has done nothing to slake the anxieties of the states’-rights proponents, 
who increasingly view post-9/11 efforts at streamlining and rationalizing basic security 
levels as a subterfuge of a national-level government on the march. 
In the wake of this opposition to REAL ID, the DHS allowed Washington State to 
beta-test a voluntary Enhanced Driver’s License (EDL) in support of the WHTI on March 
23, 2007.11 The EDL, although informed by REAL ID, is not associated with REAL 
ID.12 The program, rather, was tested and subsequently adopted by the DHS to provide 
states and their citizens a voluntary ID option to support the WHTI that is also less 
expensive and more convenient than the U.S. passport to expedite land and sea border 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 "Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative." Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/western-
hemisphere-travel-initiative (accessed October 21, 2012). 
8 Todd B. Tatelman, The REAL ID Act of 2005: Legal, Regulatory, and Implementation Issues 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008. 
9 REAL ID Act of 2005, Public Law 109-13, (2005): H.R. 418. 
10 David Williams, "REAL ID Still a REAL Mess," Taxpayers Protection Alliance, 
http://www.protectingtaxpayers.org/index.php?blog&action=view&post_id=146 (accessed October 21, 
2012). 
11 "NASCIO Recognition Award Nomination." NASCIO, 
http://www.nascio.org/awards/nominations/2009/2009WA2-
NASCIO%20AWARD%20INFORMATION%202009%20for%20EDL%20ID%20project_Final.pdf 
(accessed September 19, 2012). 
12 Tatelman, The REAL ID Act of 2005: Legal, Regulatory, and Implementation Issues 
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crossings between Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Bermuda.13 Some also have 
suggested that EDLs more accurately reflect identity and are less “elaborate”14—
arguably less invasive on state and individual rights—than REAL ID complaint driver’s 
licenses. 
The ability of 9/11 terrorists to operate under the radar with U.S.-issued driver’s 
licenses demands not only increased driver’s license acquisition standards, as Congress 
has effected with REAL ID, but also the adoption of the most secure and least invasive 
ID to assist in preventing a future attack. The EDL has this capability and more. 
Expressly, the EDL includes radio frequency identification (RFID) technology capable of 
ID authentication,15 which is a function of comparing the read-only tag identifier (TID) 
embedded within the driver’s license with federal databases or state Department of Motor 
Vehicle (DMV) databases via secure systems.16 EDLs also have the potential to be less 
invasive, not the least of which is due to the fact that the EDL is a “state” and not a 
federal ID. Additionally, the technology has the potential to increase interoperability, 
usability, security, privacy, and reduce identity theft.  
Because EDLs more accurately reflect identity, have the potential to be less 
invasive on state and individual rights, are more secure, offer more capabilities, and 
provide U.S. citizens with the option to traverse domestic borders without a passport, it 
stands to reason that all U.S. citizens, as well as federal, state, and local agencies with a 
counterterrorism mission, should be afforded these benefits rather than only the citizens 
that may purchase the capabilities from the handful of states that currently authorize the 
EDL. More importantly, if the EDL is a better tool to protect the homeland from future 
acts of terrorism and has the potential to be less invasive, REAL ID compliant driver’s 
licenses ought to be replaced or, less painfully, phased out in favor of the EDL. Once 
complete, this transition could eliminate several, if not all, of the IDs in support of the 
                                                 
13 "NASCIO Recognition Award Nomination."  
14 Audrey Hudson, "Napolitano Debates REAL ID," The Washington Times, February 20, 2009. 
15 Colleen Manaher, "Privacy Impact Assessment for the use of Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) Technology for Border Crossings," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
http://foia.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=45 (accessed September 20, 2012). 
16 "Personal Identification - AAMVA North American Standard - DL/ID Card Design." AAMVA, 
http://www.granddriver.info/uploadedFiles/MainSite/Content/SolutionsBestPractices/BestPracticesModelL
egislation(1)/DLIDCardDesignStandard2011.pdf (accessed October, 21, 2012). 
 4 
WHTI—which also would obviate several National Identification Systems (NIDS). In 
addition, converting to the EDL will bolster national security by increasing the 
authentication checks of the EDL while further decreasing privacy threats by eliminating 
WHTI ID systems utilizing long-range RFID. 
Despite the EDL’s potential, some states have enacted laws disfavoring or 
limiting use of the EDL for privacy reasons, which is a consequence of privacy groups 
that have and continue to strenuously oppose the EDL.17 Opposition focuses on the 
EDL’s use of vicinity read RFID technology. The technology, as designed, emits unique 
serial numbers at long range when in proximity of an RFID reader capable of 
communicating with the RFID tag embedded in the EDL.18 The concern, thus, is that the 
unique serial numbers will be intercepted and used for purposes other than what they 
were intended for or designed to do.19 The EDL’s impact to privacy, thus, must be 
assessed to determine if these concerns are warranted. 
This thesis seeks to analyze the EDL with an eye toward arguing that it represents 
a better option than REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses to ensure national security and 
civil liberties after the technology is replaced with an encrypted short-range RFID or 
contact (Smart Card) technology. The analysis begins with background information on 
the legal and statutory requirements associated with the driver’s license, the WHTI, then 
analysis will turn to the technology and finally privacy issues, and finds, on each front, 
that the upgraded EDL is the most effective and efficient means of identifying legitimate 
citizens of the United States at home and at the border. 
                                                 
17 "State Statutes Relating to Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and Privacy." National 
Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/radio-frequency-
identification-rfid-privacy-laws.aspx (accessed August 22, 2012). 
18 "Overview of Enhanced Driver's License." Homeland Security, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/vacation/enhanced_dl_fs.ctt/enhanced_dl_fs.pdf (accessed 
May 9, 2012). 
19 "Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems." Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (accessed September 18, 2012). 
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A. A LICENSE TO COMMIT TERRORISM WHILE CURTAILING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES? 
Since 9/11, laws have been enacted and many processes and technological 
improvements have been made to improve U.S. ID systems. One of the goals is to 
prevent terrorists from using or abusing “breeder documents”—IDs used to support an 
individual’s identity—to acquire driver’s licenses that may later facilitate terror-related 
activities.20 (Secure driver’s licenses may also prevent crime and illegal immigration, but 
the primary focus of this thesis is on the prevention of terrorism). After 9/11, there is no 
argument that terrorists with U.S. issued driver’s licenses are more capable of carrying 
out terror-related activities.21 
 Because U.S. citizens prefer a fractured ID system, Congress and the federal 
government have limited options other than to influence current ID systems or to create 
ID systems to address national security issues, either of which will lead to consternation. 
Anxieties will especially rise when the most pervasive ID in the U.S.—the state driver’s 
license—is influenced based on Big Brother fears of creating a de facto national ID. 
Muddling matters, the driver’s license is a state and not a federal function and as such, 
the Tenth Amendment protects it. Nonetheless, 9/11 demanded change to harden the 
driver’s licenses acquisition process to prevent another “Virginal driver’s license scam”22 
or some other fraudulent way to obtain these valuable IDs. 
 Alongside the impact to the Tenth Amendment, procedures and new technologies 
adopted for IDs since 9/11 have had an unfavorable impact on civil liberties. REAL ID, 
for example, has generated Fourth Amendment privacy concerns as a result of an increase 
in “system” level activity. The law also raised First Amendment concerns as a result of 
the mandatory facial biometric and the restrictions on commercial air travel. Similarly, 
the growth in WHTI IDs has, and continues, to receive criticism by privacy groups and 
many others based primarily on the use of long-range RFID. While doing nothing is not 
                                                 
20 John Mercer, "Breeder Documents," Keesing Journal of Documents & Identity, no. 29 (2009): 14-
17. 




an option, the same 9/11 vulnerabilities for the state driver’s license still exist according 
to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report dated September 2012.23 
On top of the latest report to suggest that vulnerabilities still exist in the state 
driver’s license acquisition process, other recent reports suggest that “a flood of high 
quality counterfeit” driver’s licenses are entering the U.S. from abroad, especially 
China.24 These counterfeit driver’s licenses, in fact, are only detectible under a high-
powered electron microscope. The indication, thus, is that the improvements made to the 
driver’s license acquisition processes are working, yet, have created another issue—
counterfeiting. Based on the GAO report, however, counterfeit driver’s licenses are more 
likely a result of terrorists or criminals knowing “eyes” are on the system. Nonetheless, 
the bad news—efforts to improve the acquisition process are meaningless if agents of the 
law are unable to discern counterfeit driver’s licenses. 
In order to be alerted in advance of a terrorist attack, the driver’s license or the 
acquisition thereof must raise suspicions. If the acquisition process fails, elements 
imposed—machine-readable zone, full legal name, date of birth, identification number, 
gold star—do little, if anything, to tip authorities of terrorism. Fortunately, the acquisition 
process can only improve with time. Unfortunately, process improvements will only 
evidence an increase of counterfeit driver’s licenses. In a busy security environment, say 
airport security, there is no time to analyze driver’s licenses under a high-powered 
electron microscope to ensure they are not fraudulent. 
Based on the concerns above and the fact that states, by law, can design a driver’s 
license in a number of different ways with differing levels of “observable” security 
features, REAL ID complaint driver’s licenses offer little, if any, security from the high-
quality counterfeits. What we need is a driver’s license that is: less of an impact on the 
First Amendment; less of an impact on the Fourth Amendment; less of an impact on the 
Tenth Amendment; decreases the ability to counterfeit driver’s licenses commensurate 
with acquisition hardening; decreases identity theft; increases interoperability to facilitate 
                                                 
23 Daniel Bertoni, Driver's License Security: Federal Leadership Needed to Address Remaining 
Vulnerabilities, United States Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
24 "Call to Action: The Growing Epidemic of Counterfeit Identity Documents and Practical Steps to 
Combat It." Document Security Alliance, 
http://www.documentsecurityalliance.com/forms/counterfeit_solutions.pdf (accessed October 21, 2012). 
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commerce; increases national security; decreases threats to individual privacy; and 
returns the freedoms to U.S. citizens once known before 9/11, such as having the option 
to cross borders with a driver’s license. Impossible? 
B. ENTER THE ENHANCED DRIVER’S LICENSE 
The voluntary EDL began as a pilot program in Washington State on March 23, 
2007. Washington State officials were concerned that WHTI would affect their robust 
trade, tourism, and travel relationships with Canada, especially leading up to and during 
the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia. Officials also believed the 
high cost of passports would dissuade U.S. citizens from crossing the Washington/British 
Columbia border.25 Gaining approval from the DHS, Washington State began offering 
EDLs with the same technology that supports other WHTI IDs at $15 over the cost of 
regular driver’s license and has continued to issue them ever since.26  
 Based on the success of Washington State’s pilot program, the DHS determined 
the EDL to be an acceptable stand-alone document for entry into the U.S. at all land and 
sea ports of entry.27 Approval of the EDL included aspects of security, yet cost and 
commerce were the driving factors. The “wallet-sized” driver’s license–border ID 
combination is also convenient for those who regularly traverse U.S. land and sea 
borders. 
 The WHTI’s mild attachment to the driver’s license has made it an advanced 
driver’s license tied to REAL ID improvements. The technology in support of the WHTI 
gives the EDL its distinction from REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses. Importantly, the 
technology offers the capability to authenticate the ID to ensure cardholder identity and, 
thus, is capable of thwarting the growing epidemic of counterfeit driver’s licenses 
without stifling commerce. Because states retain a degree of control, EDL’s could also 
reduce state and individual rights impacted as a result of REAL ID while at the same time 
increasing national security. 
                                                 
25 "NASCIO Recognition Award Nomination."  
26 Ibid. 
27 "Overview of Enhanced Driver's License." 
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The EDL does offer a huge capability to secure the homeland from future acts of 
terrorism. Civil liberties (privacy) concerns, however, have been raised as a result of the 
vicinity read RFID technology employed,28 which could be justified in light of the threat 
to national security. Because terrorism is a persistent threat, caution is necessary as a new 
societal expectation for that civil liberty may form as a result of erosion, especially over 
time, which cannot be undone.29 As a nation, therefore, it is critical to ensure any course 
of action that expends civil liberties is necessary and even greater if it lessens Lady 
liberty’s future candlepower. 
This thesis argues that once a short-range RFID and/or Smart Card technical 
solution is adopted, it will not only preserve Lady Liberty’s future candlepower, it will 
brighten her flame by returning civil liberties endangered as a result of REAL ID 
implementation, while at the same time increasing national security. This result will be 
accomplished by extrapolating the background on driver’s license legal reforms and 
related matters as well as the EDL’s technology and privacy issues in comparison to 
secure short-range technical solution(s). A final assessment will illustrate how a secure 
short-range RFID or Smart Card solution is necessary for national security and preserving 
civil liberties and in a greater sense, liberty. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research is a case study of the EDL using an analytic approach to assess 
security versus privacy impact. The thesis applies the analysis of proponent and opponent 
arguments of the security and privacy concerns associated with the use of vicinity read 
RFID technology employed on EDLs. Conclusions will be formed after considering the 
legal changes to driver’s licenses, subsequent concerns, and the evolution of EDLs along 
side other WHTI IDs, as well as the technological concerns associated with the use of 
vicinity read RFID to support the EDL in contrast to alternative solutions and the privacy 
concerns associated with the current EDL in contrast to alternative solutions. After an 
                                                 
28 "Why the Enhanced Driver's License is Wrong for California." American Civil Liberties Union of 
Northern California, https://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/asset_upload_file944_8427.pdf (accessed 
August 27, 2012). 
29 Joshua Levy, "Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technology Change," Virginia 
Journal of Law & Technology 16, no. 4 (Winter, 2011): 504. 
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assessment of the EDL to support an argument for a change in technology, final analysis 
of information will result in a recommendation(s) that best balances national security 
alongside state and individual rights and in particular, privacy. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with a background chapter (II) with the following subsections: 
In The Cards: Identification Since 9/11; The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act; The REAL ID Act of 2005; The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; 
and The Take Away. The focus of Chapter II is the “who, what, when, why, and where” 
of driver’s license standards beginning with the attacks on 9/11 leading up to the 
subsequent use of RFID-enabled driver’s licenses for border security. Emphasis will be 
placed on issues associated with the REAL ID, particularly, the concerns to state and 
individual rights, and the problems and limitations of the REAL ID to form the 
arguments for subsequent chapters related to the underlying privacy vs. national security 
debate. 
Chapter III will analyze the technological concerns associated with EDL’s 
vicinity read RFID technology with the following subsections: A Short History on RFID 
For Border Control; the Technology Argument in a Nutshell; the RFID Basics for 
Identity Documents; Technological Concerns for the RFID-Enabled EDL; a Technology 
Comparison of Identity Documents; Other Technological Considerations; and the Take 
Away and Solution. The analysis of ID technologies (alternatives to vicinity read RFID 
technology, barcode technology, magnetic swipe technology, and Smart Card 
technology) will also assist the Chapter V assessment and recommendations in Chapter 
VI. 
Chapter IV will analyze the privacy concerns associated with the EDL with the 
following subsections: The Privacy and National Security Debate; Contextual Evaluation 
of the Current EDL; and Does the Improved EDL Address Privacy Concerns? The 
analysis of the privacy concerns will assess both the vicinity read RFID against the 
technologies identified in Chapter III that were identified as superior. Importantly, 
analysis will further support a need for a secure solution and assist in making assessments 
in Chapter V and recommendations in Chapter VI. 
 10 
Chapter V will provide a full assessment of all information gathered with 
following subsections: Political Assessment; Economic Assessment; Limitations 
Assessment; Technological Assessment; and Privacy Assessment. Combined, the 
assessments will showcase the optimal solution and form the recommends for Chapter 
VI. The objective is to demonstrate that the EDL not only benefits all federal, state, and 
local officials in the quest to prevent another devastating attack, but also provides the 
optimum solution to preserve our cherished civil liberties. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
9/11 revealed that state driver’s licenses are a national security imperative, which 
was a consequence of the role they played in support of the 9/11 hijackers prior to their 
dastardly act. The gap in national security demanded action by Congress. States and 
privacy groups, however, continue to challenge Congressional actions and the DHS 
responses. Often options to reduce pushback are not apparent. This chapter will lay the 
groundwork in support of an argument that the EDL, with necessary modifications to 
technology, is a more secure, efficient, and less invasive solution to REAL ID compliant 
driver’s licenses. 
A. IN THE CARDS: IDENTIFICATION SINCE 9/11 
The investigation into 9/11 revealed that 18 of the 19 hijackers had obtained 
driver’s licenses from various states, and at least six were used as valid ID to board the 
aircraft that rammed the World Trade Center buildings and the Pentagon. Significantly, 
seven of these driver’s licenses were fraudulently obtained from the State of Virginia, and 
14 of the 18 were duplicates, that is, the 9/11 hijackers obtained more than one valid state 
driver’s license.30 The driver’s licenses, thus, allowed the hijackers to make their plans 
and prepare their attack without arousing suspicion, which is why the 9/11 Commission 
members deemed driver’s licenses, and the IDs to acquire them, to be as important as 
weapons to terrorists.31 
From the evidence, the 9/11 Commission stated: “Secure identification should 
begin in the United States. The federal government should set standards for the issuance 
of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver’s licenses. Fraud in 
identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to 
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the 
last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether 
                                                 
30 Kephart, Identity and Security: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Identity Document 
Security, 21. 
31 Merserve and Ahlers, 9/11 Commission Members Act to Finally Wrap it Up 
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they are terrorists.”32 This observation echoed the 2003 Second Report of the Markle 
Foundation Task Force, which argued that collateral improvements to U.S. IDs, 
particularly driver’s licenses, be made to enhance security. Specifically, the Markle report 
concluded, the federal government should: 1) assist in making state driver’s licenses and 
other state-issued ID documents more reliable; and 2) study whether biometric or 
cryptographic technologies can increase reliability while addressing privacy concerns.33 
The attacks on 9/11 served as a wake-up call to improve standards for commonly 
issued U.S. driver’s licenses and such other forms of ID as birth certificates and passports 
and to increase the capability of systems that rely on IDs to safeguard the national, 
economic security and public safety of the United States, notably border security, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and the DMV. Congress responded by enacting two laws, 
IRTPA and the REAL ID Act of 2005, which established federal requirements for IDs 
and tightened the requirements, procedures and processes associated with IDs. These acts 
gave rise to the changes to driver’s licenses and, thus, the subsequent issues, limitations 
and concerns. 
B. THE 2004 INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION 
ACT 
The first effort on driver’s license and personal IDs came in the form of the 
IRTPA, sponsored by Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine). Congress passed the act on 
December 17, 2004, in response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Although the 
law covers many aspects, the following items in Section 7209(a) were linked to IDs: 1) 
existing identification procedures allow many individuals to enter the U.S. by showing 
minimal identification or without showing any identification; 2) the planning for the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrates that terrorists study and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities; 
and 3) additional safeguards are needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United 
States.34 Section 7209(b)(1) of the IRTPA mandated that by January 1, 2008: 
                                                 
32 Kean and others, The 9/11 Commission Report, 585-390. 
33 "Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security: Second Report of the Markle 
Foundation Task Force," Markle Foundation, 2003. 
34 Collins, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1001-8404. 
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The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, shall develop and implement a plan as expeditiously as possible to 
require a passport or other document, or combination of documents, 
deemed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to be sufficient to denote 
identity and citizenship for all travel into the United States by United 
States citizens and by categories of individuals for whom documentation 
requirements have previously been waived under section 212(d)(4)(B) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(4)(B))35 
Section 7212 of the IRTPA also established federal standards for driver’s licenses 
and personal ID cards and indicated that no federal agency would accept a driver’s 
license or personal ID card two years after a date established by the Secretary of 
Transportation (no less than eighteen months from enactment of the IRTPA unless 
minimum federal standards were met). A two-year extension was afforded if a state was 
making a reasonable attempt to meet the deadline. Section 7212(b)(2) stipulated the 
following minimum standards for states:36 
• Standards for documentation required as proof of identity and an applicant 
for a driver’s license or personal identification card 
• Standards for the verifiability of documents used to obtain a driver’s 
license or personal identification card 
• Standards for the processing of applications for driver’s licenses and 
personal identification cards to prevent fraud 
• Standards for information to be included on each driver’s license or 
personal identification card, including: the person’s full legal name; the 
person’s date of birth; the person’s gender; the person’s driver’s license or 
personal identification card number; a digital photograph of the person; 
the person’s address of principle residence; and the person’s signature 
• Standards for common machine-readable identity information to be 
included on each driver’s license or personal identification card, including 
defined minimum data elements 
• Security standards to ensure that driver’s licenses and personal 
identification cards are: resistant to tampering, alteration, or 
counterfeiting; and capable of accommodating and ensuring the security of 
a digital photograph or other unique identifier 




• A requirement that a State confiscate a driver’s license or personal 
identification card if any component or security feature of the license or 
identification card is compromised 
The requirements of Section 7212 were not well received by states and privacy 
groups. The arguments, in general, were that the IRTPA interfered with the right to grant 
driver’s licenses to certain categories of individuals—for instance, legal aliens—unfairly 
mandated a single uniform design, failed to include procedures to protect the privacy 
rights of individual applicants, and did not make use of negotiated rulemaking pursuant to 
the Administrative Procedure Act.37 Congress, in response, repealed Section 7212 and 
enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005. 
C. THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 
Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 on May 11 of the same year as 
supplemental bill (Division B) to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief (P.L. 109–13). The law, 
sponsored by James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), repealed section 7212 of the IRTPA 
to clarify federal ID standards and relax the federal mandate inferred by the IRTPA.38  
Unlike the IRTPA, REAL ID clearly does not demand compliance. Noncompliant 
state-issued driver’s licenses and ID cards, however, must be marked and feature a 
unique design or color to alert federal agencies or law enforcement personnel that they do 
not comply with the REAL ID guidelines. Either way, driver’s license data must still be 
electronically accessible by all other states and contain such information as drivers’ 
histories, including violations, suspensions, and points against the license. The law also 
stipulates that noncompliant IDs are insufficient for “official purposes,” to include such 
activities as boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft or entering federally 
controlled facilities.39 States, thus, have a significant incentive to make their licenses 
accord with REAL ID standards. 
Driver’s license and identity document standards are listed under Section 202(b), 
Minimum Document Requirements; Section 202(c), Minimum Issuance Standards; and 
                                                 
37 Tatelman, The REAL ID Act of 2005: Legal, Regulatory, and Implementation Issues 
38 Sensenbrenner, REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418-H.R. 1268. 
39 Ibid. 
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Section 202(d), Other Requirements.40 The minimum document requirements for federal 
purposes are as follows: 
• The person’s full legal name 
• The person’s date of birth 
• The person’s gender 
• The person’s driver’s license number or identification card number 
• A digital photograph of the person 
• The person’s principle address 
• The person’s signature 
• Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, 
or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes 
• A common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data 
elements 
The minimum issuance requirements are as follows: 
• A photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity document is 
acceptable if it includes both a person’s full legal name and date of birth 
• Document showing the person’s date of birth 
• Proof of a person’s social security account number or verification that the 
person is not eligible for a social security number 
• Documentation showing the person’s name and address of principle 
residence 
• Evidence of lawful status 
• Other requirements include: 
• Employ technology to capture digital images of identity source documents 
so that the images can be retained in electronic storage in a transferable 
format 
• Retain paper copies of source documents for a minimum of 7 years or 
images of source documents presented for a minimum of 10 years 
• Subject each person applying for a driver’s license or ID card to 
mandatory facial image capture 
• Establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a renewing 
applicant’s information 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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• Confirm with the Social Security Administration a social security account 
number presented by a person using the full social security number and 
resolve discrepancies 
• Refuse to issue a driver’s license or ID card to a person holding a driver’s 
license issued by another State without confirming that the person is 
terminating or has terminated the driver’s license 
• Ensure the physical security of locations where driver’s licenses and ID 
cards are produced and the security document materials and papers from 
which driver’s licenses and ID cards are produced 
• Subject all persons authorized to manufacture or produce driver’s licenses 
and ID cards to appropriate security clearance requirements 
• Establish fraudulent documentation recognition training programs for 
appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of driver’s licenses and ID 
cards 
• Limit the period of validity of all driver’s licenses and ID cards that are 
not temporary to a period that does not exceed eight years 
1. REAL Concerns 
According to REAL ID, federal requirements were to be imposed three years 
from the date of enactment, May 11, 2008.41 The implementation timeline, however, has 
been twice extended and is currently January 15, 2013.42 The latest deadline is unlikely 
to be achieved despite significant progress. Much has to do with funding, though state 
and privacy group opposition has been a significant factor. Major concerns about the law 
include its constitutionality—states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment, freedom of 
religion (mandatory facial image capture) under the First Amendment—undue 
restrictions on commercial air travel, and inadequate federal funding to impose the law 
per the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act.43 
More controversially, many opponents believe that the law creates a de facto 
national ID.44 The national ID concern is, in large part, a consequence of Section 
202(d)(12), which requires DMV databases to be electronically accessible to all states (in 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Janice L. Kephart, "REAL ID Implementation Annual Report: Major Progress made in Securing 
Driver's License Issuance Against Identity Theft and Fraud," Backgrounder (February, 2012): 11.  
43 Tatelman, The REAL ID Act of 2005: Legal, Regulatory, and Implementation Issues 
44 Ibid. 
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response to the evidence that hijackers acquired driver’s licenses from multiple states). In 
fact, more than twenty-five privacy groups continue to oppose the law for this and other 
privacy concerns, to include, but not limited to, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), American Liberty Association (ALA), Center for Democracy and Technology 
(CDT), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and the Rutherford Institute.45 
Privacy advocates are also concerned that Section 202(d)(12) will increase 
privacy risks, as thousands of DMVs will have access to millions of Americans personal 
identifiable information (PII) that place them at greater risk of identity theft if the system 
is compromised.46 This danger is compounded by the requirement to capture source 
documents (Section 202(d)(2)).47 Many DMVs, however, are increasingly utilizing the 
Electronic Verification of Vital Events (EVVE) system to verify birth certificates, Social 
Security On-Line Verification (SSLOV) to verify Social Security Numbers (SSNs), and 
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system that could conceivably cut 
down on source documents the DMV captures and stores electronically.48 
Another controversial matter concerns the mandatory facial biometric in Section 
202(d)(3). It is not required to be stored on the driver’s license, but for some, it smacks of 
domestic intelligence and social control.49 Facial biometric is largely considered 
precognitive (guilty until proven innocent), while other biometrics, such as fingerprints, 
are generally not (innocent until proven guilty). The concern is that civil liberties, 
particularly privacy, could be compromised as a result of unwarranted surveillance, 
tracking, linking or the transfer of biometric data between databases, and the proliferation 
of biometrics on databases.50 
                                                 
45 "Secure Identification: The REAL ID Act's Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and 
Identification Cards." http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-103_73416.PDF (accessed 
September 18, 2012). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Sensenbrenner, REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418-H.R. 1268. 
48 Kephart, REAL ID Implementation Annual Report: Major Progress made in Securing Driver's 
License Issuance Against Identity Theft and Fraud, 11. 
49 "Biometrics: Who's Watching You?" Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
https://www.eff.org/wp/biometrics-whos-watching-you (accessed September, 20, 2012). 
50 Ibid. 
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2. REAL Limitations 
 Title 6 CFR 37.15, in support of REAL ID, titled “Physical security features for 
the driver’s license or identification card” provides a need for driver’s licenses and ID 
cards to be designed “to deter forgery and counterfeiting, promote an adequate level of 
confidence in the authenticity of cards, and facilitate detection of fraudulent cards.”51  
Specifically, they must not be capable of being reproduced using technologies that are 
commonly used and made available to the general public; and they must contain a well-
designed, balanced set of features that are effectively combined to provide multiple layers 
of security.52  
 To comply with 6 CFR 37.15, states must employ a minimum of three levels of 
security. Level 1 involves the detection of fraudulent IDs by a cursory visual examination 
and without tools or aids. Examples include a holographic feature, tactile engraving (data 
burnt onto the ID), complex background, tactile or raised feature, or a laser-engraved 
photograph. Level 2 involves the detection of fraudulent IDs through examination by 
trained inspectors with simple equipment—perhaps an ultraviolet light or a magnifying 
glass. Level 3 involves the detection of fraudulent IDs through examination by forensic 
specialists of items only seen with high magnification or an electron microscope.53 
 The major limitation of REAL ID compliant driver’s license, thus, is the lack of a 
common denominator. That is to say, states can comply with the REAL ID’s physical 
security requirements in many ways. A TSA agent, law enforcement officer, or other 
official cannot be expected to memorize or discern all of the designs and security features 
each state imposes, especially in a busy security environment like airport security. 
Moreover, each state often has three or more types of IDs. Just the State of Michigan, for 
example, has a normal ID card, an enhanced ID card, a normal driver’s license, the EDL, 
                                                 
51 "Title 6 - Homeland Security 6 CFR Part 37: 37.15 Physical Security Features for the Driver's 
License Or Identification Card." Department of Homeland Security, 
http://uscis.gov/ilink/docView/6CFR/HTML/6CFR/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-4972/0-0-0-5202.html (accessed 
September 20, 2012). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Marty Kenner, Bruce Wilson and Steve Rhyner, "U.S. Driver's Licenses: Addressing the Potential 
Vulnerabilities," 3M, 
http://solutions.3m.com/3MContentRetrievalAPI/BlobServlet?lmd=1329168842000&locale=en_WW&ass
etType=MMM_Image&assetId=1319220855046&blobAttribute=ImageFile (accessed September, 20, 
2012). 
 19 
as well as different IDs with the design turned on its side to indicate that the bearer is 
younger than 21 (see Figure 11). When all 56 jurisdictions are combined, thus, it does not 
take a perfect counterfeit driver’s license or ID card to undermine security, particularly 




Figure 1.  Michigan Driver’s Licenses & ID Cards. (From TOKENWORKS, 
Department of State, and Michigan Secretary of State respectively.) 
 Another major limitation is a result of the evidence revealing that only Level 3 
offers a credible level of security that, again, requires an electron microscope.54 
According to the Document Security Alliance: “There is a growing sophistication in high 
quality counterfeit driver’s licenses and state issued IDs, some of which are produced 
overseas and others in major metropolitan areas by professional criminals. In particular, 
there is a virtual flood of low cost, high quality counterfeits being shipped by the tens of 
thousands from China…”55 Speculation for the increase in high-quality counterfeits is a 
consequence of REAL ID efforts to harden the driver’s license acquisition process or the 
fear of knowing the system is more heavily monitored. Irrespective, it is impractical for 
agents of the law in the course of normal duty to discern a Level 3 abnormality. 
                                                 
54 Matt Markovich, "'Near-Perfect" Fake IDs Pose Law Enforcement Challenge," Komonews, 
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Near-perfect-fake-IDs-pose-law-enforcement-challenge-
153736705.html (accessed October 21, 2012). 
55 "Call to Action: The Growing Epidemic of Counterfeit Identity Documents and Practical Steps to 
Combat It."  
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3. REAL Status 
Final Rule 5–08, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification 
Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes (73 FR 5271), published on 
January 29, 2008, addressed some of the major concerns of REAL ID aired during a 60-
day public comment window that received 21,000 comments to the DHS and 
subsequently codified in subsections of 6 CFR Part 37.56 Of the many notable 
concessions, the following are considered significant changes: 
• The DHS is working with the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators (AAMVA) network for state-to-state verification of IDs, 
which operates on an end-to-end encrypted network not tied to the 
Intranet. 
• The use of the AAMVA network supports verification of SSNs and birth 
certificates and the application systems that enable states to query SSOLV 
and EVVE securely. 
• The DHS relaxed the demand to “refuse to issue a driver’s license or 
identification card to a person holding a driver’s license issued by another 
state without confirmation…” and now only encourages the policy of “one 
driver, one license” and/or a reasonable attempt to verify. 
• Driver’s licenses that are REAL ID-complaint must conform to the “one 
driver, one license” concept. 
• The DHS deleted proposed card design standards, and replaced the 
language with the need for states to provide the DHS with the designs 
applied to resist compromise of the ID. 
 The latest 2012 report on the implementation of the REAL ID indicates that 53 of 
56 state and territorial jurisdictions have embraced REAL ID principles; 36 are 
“materially or substantially materially” compliant. Moreover, only three jurisdictions, 
two of which are territories, have not embraced REAL ID principles.57 Notably, 39 states 
have proposed or enacted legislation to urge Congress to respect state rights and the 
                                                 
56 "Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal 
Agencies for Official Purposes [73 FR 5271][FR 5-08]." Office of the Secretary, DHS, 
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/FR/HTML/FR/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-145991/0-0-0-165820/0-0-0-
176819.html 
57 Kephart, REAL ID Implementation Annual Report: Major Progress made in Securing Driver's 
License Issuance Against Identity Theft and Fraud, 11. 
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privacy of driver’s license applicants.58 Yet, all 56 jurisdictions have accepted a portion 
of the $263 million in total federal grants since 2007 to support aspects of REAL ID, a 
strong indication that all states and territories will eventually become REAL ID 
compliant.59  
 On March 21, 2012, Representative Sensenbrenner expressed concerns over the 
DHS’s commitment to the REAL ID.60 His comments focused on the lack of manpower 
allocated to the Office of State-Issued Identification Support within the Office of Policy; 
the fact that the DHS had not published grant guidance for FY12; the fact that the DHS 
had not notified the U.S. public about the impeding deadline set for REAL ID, and a 
latent willingness to support the proposed PASS ID Act.61 The DHS, however, contends 
that significant progress has been accomplished in the face of strong opposition to the 
law. 
D. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE 
 Before 9/11 and for several years thereafter, it was possible for U.S. citizens to 
cross into Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Bermuda with a state driver’s license and 
sometimes with no ID at all. Based on the 9/11 Commission report, Congress recognized 
a need to tighten security at the border and, with IRTPA, signed into law a requirement 
for the DHS to develop a solution by January 1, 2008.62 Recognizing implementation 
timeline issues, the President signed into law the Department of Homeland Security 
                                                 
58 "REAL ID State Legislation Database." National Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/transport/real-id-state-legislation.aspx (accessed September 18, 2012). 
59 Kephart, REAL ID Implementation Annual Report: Major Progress made in Securing Driver's 
License Issuance Against Identity Theft and Fraud, 11. 
60 "Secure Identification: The REAL ID Act's Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and 
Identification Cards." 104-7. 
61 Providing for Additional Security in States Identification Act of 2009, or PASS ID Act, sought 
repeal title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and amend title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 
better protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personally identifiable information collected by 
States when issuing driver's licenses and identification documents. The bill, however, met heavy resistance 
as it replaced the substance of REAL ID by deleting identity verification and document authentication and 
replacing them with what is, for the most part, the status quo in most states, or standards that are less 
rigorous than those now in place.  
62 Collins, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1001-8404. 
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Appropriations Act of 2007 on October 2, 2006, amending section 7209 of the IRPTA to 
establish June 1, 2009, as the deadline for implementing travel requirements.63 
On April 2, 2008, DHS established a joint final rule (73 FR 18384), effective June 
1, 2009, to implement WHTI.64 All travellers crossing borders, to include the land or sea 
borders into the U.S. from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and Bermuda, thus, must meet 
ID requirements. Valid U.S. IDs include: U.S. Passport; Passport Card; Enhanced 
Driver’s License; Trusted Traveller Program Card (i.e., NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, and 
Global Entry); U.S. Military ID card with official orders; U.S. Merchant Mariner 
document (Z-Card) when travelling in conjunction with official maritime business; and 














                                                 
63 "Documents Required for Travelers Departing from Or Arriving in the United States at Air Ports-
of-Entry from within the Western Hemisphere." Federal Register 71, (November 24, 2006): 68412. 
64 "Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: Designation of Enhanced Driver's Licenses and Identity 
Documents Issued by the States of Vermont and Michigan and the Provinces of Quebec, Manitoba, British 
Columbia, and Ontario as Acceptable Documents to Denote Identity and Citizenship." The Federal 
Register, www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/05/29/E9-12513/western-hemisphere-travel-initiative-
designation-of-enhanced-drivers-licenses-and-identity-documents (accessed May 11, 2012). 
65 "Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: Land and Sea Travel Document Requirements." U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/travel/whti_state_factsheet.ctt/whti_state_fact
sheet.pdf (accessed May 11, 2012). 
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Table 1.   Border ID General Comparison Chart66  
1. U.S. Passport 
 The U.S. passport (see Figure 1) is the standard border-crossing ID recognized at 
all air, land, and sea ports of entry (not a WHTI ID, but it is border ID). It currently costs 
                                                 
66 [Note SN=serial number] 
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$140 for adults and $80 for minors, plus an additional $25 for first-time applicants.67 
Since August of 2007, all U.S. passports utilize passive-read (short-range) RFID 
technology—e-passports—as a result of the standards set by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the United Nations (U.N.) to facilitate border 
security.68 Data stored on the RFID technology includes what is visually displayed on the 
data page of the passport, a biometric identifier in the form of a digital facial image, a 




Figure 2.  Passport, United States of America. (From Translators and Christians.) 
2. Trusted Traveler 
 “Trusted Traveler” programs allow expedited border crossing or security searches 
for regular border-crossers who agree to provide certain personal information to the 
government in advance through the application process.70 The four WHTI Trusted 
Traveler programs for low-risk travelers are NEXUS, the Secure Electronic Network for 
Travelers’ Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), and Global Entry 
                                                 
67 "Passport Fees." U.S. Department of State, http://travel.state.gov/passport/fees/fees_837.html 
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(see Figure 2).71 NEXUS cards are designed for prescreened Canadian and U.S. citizens 
on specified northern-border locations and currently cost $50 per person.72 SENTRI 
cards are similar to NEXUS cards for specified locations on the southern border at a 
current cost $122.25.73 FAST cards are also similar to NEXUS and SENTRI cards, yet 
can be found at specified locations on both the northern and southern borders at a current 
cost of $50; most FAST card holders are truckers who cross the borders regularly.74 
Global Entry cards are good for SENTRI and NEXUS lanes as well as expedited 
domestic air travel with certain airlines and at particular locations, at a current cost of 
$100.75 All Trusted Traveler programs have a dedicated commuter lane(s) to expedite 
travel that is further facilitated by vicinity read (long-range) RFID technology embedded 
within the IDs that emits a unique ID number.76 
 
 
Figure 3.  SENTRI, NEXUS, FAST, & Global Entry. (From U.S. Customs Border 
Protection.) 
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3. PASS Card and Enhanced Driver’s License 
 The passport card (PASS card) and EDL are IDs approved for the WHTI (see 
Figure 3). Unlike the Trusted Traveller programs, PASS cards and EDLs can be used to 
enter the U.S. from all land-border crossings between the U.S. and Canada, Mexico, the 
Caribbean, and Bermuda as well as sea ports-of-entry (not approved for international 
travel by air).77 PASS cards currently cost $55 for adults and $40 for minors under the 
age of 16. Renewal of card costs $30.78 EDLs, unlike PASS cards, are not available to all 
citizens. At this time only the residents from Michigan, New York, Vermont, and 
Washington have the option, though other states, like Minnesota, are making 
arrangements.79 The average cost of an EDL is $30 over the cost of a regular driver’s 
license (Michigan, $4580; New York, $3081; Vermont, $2582; Washington State, $3583; 
Minnesota passed legislation indicating $1584). Both the PASS card and EDL employ 
vicinity-read RFID technology that emits a unique ID number to facilitate border 
security.85 
Unlike any of the other WHTI IDs, to include the PASS card, states that desire to 
issue EDLs to U.S. citizens must enter into an agreement with the DHS.86 States can 
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choose either a “push” or “pull” method to give CBP agents the ability to verify 
cardholder identity and to authenticate the driver’s license. In the push method, states 
transfer data to a secure database controlled by the DHS. In the pull model, however, 
“issuing states store their data in their own database and CBP retrieves the data at time of 
presentation at a border crossing via NLETS.”87 NLETS is nonprofit organization that 
offers a secure and audited system, “owned by the States,” for the exchange of law 
enforcement information.88 
To obtain an EDL, U.S. citizens are required show proof of the following: 1) a 
valid Social Security Number; 2) source documents, such as a birth certificate, to prove 
U.S. citizenship; 3) identity verification through a photo document; and 4) proof of 
residency. In addition, they must have a personal interview with a licensing 
representative to verify the applicant’s information.89 Of note, the only tangible 
procedural difference between REAL ID and the EDL for U.S. citizens is the personal 
interview. 
 According to Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, “enhanced 
driver’s licenses give confidence that the person holding the card is the person who is 
supposed to be holding the card, and it’s less elaborate than REAL ID.”90 All EDLs 
issued to date, however, comply and are expected to comply with the document and 
issuance requirements of REAL ID and as such, are more elaborate than REAL ID 
compliant driver’s licenses. Expressly, EDLs include RFID technology that emits a 
unique ID number capable of interfacing with CBT systems at long read range, which 
allows them to interface with state or federal databases to validate the identity of the 
cardholder and authenticate the EDL. 
Although EDLs comply with REAL ID document and issuance requirements, not 
all elements of REAL ID have been satisfied by some of the state’s issuing EDLs. 
Washington State, for example, passed legislation to oppose REAL ID based on the 
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privacy concerns.91 The privacy concerns of vicinity read RFID-enabled EDLs, however, 
are just as prevalent. Concerns stem not only from privacy advocates, but also from 
members of Congress, RFID manufacturers, scholars, and many U.S. citizens.92  
 
 
Figure 4.  Passport Card & Enhanced Driver’s License. (From U.S. Department of State 
and The New York Times.) 
4. Other Credentials 
 Other credentials accepted for border crossings are the U.S. Military ID with 
official orders, the Z-card, and the FM I-872 American Indian Card or Enhanced Tribal 
Card (see Figure 4). Although the military ID card has contact technology (i.e., smart 
chip without RFID), it is not used as a means of verification or authentication and as 
such, military orders provide a means of verification. Z-cards also do not employ RFID 
technology, however, they are being phased out. For Native Americans, FM I-872 
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Figure 5.  Military ID, Z-Card & Enhanced Tribal Card. (From Spousebuzz, United 
States Coast Guard, and U.S Department of Homeland Security.) 
E. THE TAKE-AWAY 
State driver’s licenses are valuable IDs for terrorists to disguise activity and/or to 
assimilate into society; thus, it is necessary to ensure the acquisition process is secure to 
assure identity of U.S. citizens and that agents of the law who rely on state driver’s 
licenses are able to safeguard national security and public safety. Yet, levying change 
upon the state driver’s licenses has been precarious as it invigorated and continues to 
stimulate anxiety, particularly for state rights, individual rights, privacy concerns, and de 
facto ID concerns. The difficulties have led to additional ID fracturing and growth in PII 
in federally controlled, but secure, database systems to support ID requirements. 
Countermeasures to ensure ID security are capable of preventing terrorists from 
producing a counterfeit driver’s license at Level 3, but inadequate for everyday use when 
high-quality counterfeits are capable of defeating Level 1 and Level 2 security. Thus, a 
need exists for an interoperable, secure, and quick system to reduce the ability to 
counterfeit a driver’s licenses with little or no impact to commerce. The RFID solutions 
used in border IDs, particularly the EDL, ostensibly offers the capably to fill this gap. 
The EDL provides proof that it is possible to use authentication technology for all 
drivers’ licenses, which may alleviate the pressure to develop alternative ID solutions for 
border security that could still remain optional for that purpose. The EDL also indicates 
that the need for a large federal database is unnecessary, as it is possible to satisfy both 
state and federal needs using the “pull” model that is both state owned and operated. The 
EDL, however, has generated privacy concerns due to using the same long-range 
technology for other border ID solutions; hence, a need to extrapolate the technology and 
concerns to assess them. 
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III. TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS 
The aspect that gives the EDL its character—some argue a character flaw—is the 
technology embedded within the ID. Because the technology defines the EDL, an 
examination of the technology is required. Also necessary is a comparative analysis of 
the EDL’s technology with other common ID technologies, which will help gauge 
whether the technology is appropriate and whether it offers a more secure solution to 
REAL ID complaint driver’s licenses. Importantly, analysis will provide the backbone to 
the “necessary” technological changes. The focus will be on the technologies 
superimposed on or within the ID, particularly, the strengths and weaknesses critics have 
described as a security or privacy issue. Systems that extend beyond the ID such as 
readers will not be analyzed or will be briefly described. 
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF RFID FOR BORDER CONTROL 
The earliest use of RFID technology for access control is the electronic door lock 
opened by an RFID key card, which was patented by Charles Walton in 1973.94 Practical 
use of RFID technology, however, has a rich history dating back to World War II, when 
the British used the technology to identify friend and foe aircraft.95 Advancements in 
recent decades have reduced the size and cost of RFID technology and as such, have 
increased the number of purposes (supply chain management, tracking livestock, 
controlling building access) to include access control for the border.96  
The first recorded use RFID technology for U.S. borders is the SENTRI card 
deployed in November of 1995, which came about as a result of Al Gore’s “Vice 
President’s National Partnership for Reinventing Government” initiative to streamline 
government.97 The SENTRI program commenced in Otay Mesa, California, to vet low-
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risk border crossers for use of a dedicated lane and cursory check. A June 2000 
evaluation of the program (before 9/11) indicated wait time in the SENTRI lane was 
lower than the general inspection lanes and there was greater confidence in security. The 
report did not ascertain, however, if the general inspection lanes wait times increased as a 
result of losing a lane(s) to SENTRI users.98 The program, nevertheless, prompted other 
similar programs (NEXUS in June of 2002, FAST in December of 2002).99 
The next evolution in RFID technology for border control was e-passports (see 
Figure 6). E-passports began as a result of collaboration between a United Kingdom 
software company, Digital Locksmith, and a Malaysian hardware company, Iris 
Corporation, at about the same time SENTRI was employed in the United States. 
Malaysia, as a result, was the first to deploy RFID in passports in 1998.100 The same 
year, the New Technologies Working Group (NTWG) of the Technical Advisory Group 
on Machine Readable Travel Documents (TAG/MRTD) began a study in support of the 
ICAO chartered under the U.N. to find a technical solution for electronic passports.101 
 
Figure 6.  Electronic Passport. From Electronics-Lab 
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In the wake of 9/11, the U.N. adopted RFID-enabled passports in 2003 as the 
international standard based on the recommendations made by the NTWG of the 
TAG/MRTD. The RFID technical solution was premised on several factors; in particular, 
it had to be non-proprietary, available worldwide for global interoperability, useable in 
paper/cloth passports, have adequate memory capacity to hold a facial biometric and 
possibly more, and easy to fit into a reader. Nations were to remain responsible for 
maintaining and controlling databases while considering the use of other biometrics (iris 
scan, fingerprint) to augment the international standard facial biometric decided on (facial 
biometric was considered less invasive than other biometrics).102 
As of August 2007, the U.S. requires all passports to be electronic.103 Since 2007, 
thus, the use of RFID technology as a means of facilitating the verification of identity at 
U.S. borders has grown substantially. In fact, more than 99 percent of the inbound vehicle 
traffic at U.S. borders is verified via RFID technology and has contributed the DHS’s 
2011 reported success rate of 97-percent verification of travelers passing the U.S. 
northern borders.104 Needless to say, the use of RFID technology for border control is 
now commonplace in the U.S and around the world and as such, unlikely to be usurped 
by another technology in the near future. Yet, may types of RFID technology exist and 
modifications or improvements to RFID have and continue to be made and as such, 
suggestions for improvement are available. 
B. THE TECHNOLOGY ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL 
 According to the DHS, vicinity read (long-range) RFID-enabled EDLs offer 
several benefits. Foremost, this technology increases ID security. Expressly, it adds a 
level of credibility that the ID belongs to the individual that it has been issued to, which is 
a function of comparing the RFID’s unique serial number and the non-rewritable TID 
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number embedded on the tag with database information.105 The long read range, 
arguably, also expedites border crossings by pre-positioning an individual’s data before 
agent verification.106 
 Opponents of vicinity read EDLs point out fundamental flaws.107 First, RFID is 
not an authorization alone; the ID still must be verified—handled—at the border and as 
such, the long-range RFID is unnecessary. Second, no law specifies the type of 
technology required on driver’s licenses and as such, other technologies could be 
employed with greater emphasis on privacy. Third, not all border-crossing documents use 
a long-range RFID solution—for example, e-passports do not—diminishing the implied 
need for long-range RFID.108 
C. THE RFID BASICS FOR IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 
RFID technology is a contactless means of gathering data through the use of 
inductive coupling or backscatter radio waves—magnetic near field versus electric far 
field.109 The use of radio waves, thus, allows data to be transmitted and received through 
solid materials. The system comprises three basic components: a transponder or tag with 
antenna for transmitting data; a reader (mobile or stationary); and the middleware or 
management system for translating, reading, or writing data to or from the tag through the 
reader for a specific purpose (see Figure 7).110 Each component has features that affect 
functionality or capability. The most important is the tag embedded into the ID. 
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Figure 7.  RFID System.111 
Tags are classified as passive, active, or semi-passive and come in various shapes 
and sizes (Figure 8). Some are smaller than a grain of sand.112 Passive tags, unlike active 
tags, contain no internal battery and depend on current from RFID readers for power.113 
Most passive tags store a few bytes of data, though prototypes are underway that can 
store as much as 500 kilobytes (KB).114 Semi-passive tags have a battery but remain 
dormant until awakened by an RFID reader. Active tags are considered more reliable than 
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passive tags albeit more expensive and dependent on battery strength/life.115 Basic active 
tags store 128 KB of data, though they are capable of more.116  
 
   
Figure 8.  RFID Tag Examples. (From Wikipedia.com, RFIDvirus.org, and Made-in-
China.com respectively.) 
If the tag has read-write rather than read-only capability, data on the tag can be 
manipulated with or without the tag owner’s consent. The tag does not alert when in 
contact with readers.117 RFID-enabled ID systems do, however, use, at varying levels of 
complexity, the principle of mutual authentication (tag and reader must have matching 
key codes) and password protections to ensure the data on the tag cannot be accessed or 
manipulated.118 If needed, RFID systems may also apply encryption. 
Although the non-alert aspect is seemingly controversial for human IDs, the 
capability most often cited as a security or privacy issue is read range, expressly, the 
farther a signal transmits, the more likely it is to be intercepted with or without 
acknowledgement. A tag’s read range depends on a number of factors, for example, type 
of tag, battery power, size of antenna, output of the reader, interference.119 Generally 
                                                 
115 "The Basics of RFID Technology," 5. 
116 Neil Jones, "RFID and the Difference between Passive and Active RFID Tags," Ezine Articles, 
http://ezinearticles.com/?RFID-and-the-Difference-Between-Passive-and-Active-RFID-Tags&id=3428256 
(accessed August 27, 2012). 
117 Nicole A. Ozer, "Rights "Chipped" Away: RFID and Identification Documents," Stanford 
Technology Law Review 1, no. 1 (2008), http://stlr.stanford.edu/2008/01/rights-chipped-away/. 
118 Gerhard Hancke, "A Practical Relay Attack on ISO 14443 Proximity Cards," University of 
Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, http://www.rfidblog.org.uk/hancke-rfidrelay.pdf (accessed September 
20, 2012). 
119 Ozer, Rights "Chipped" Away: RFID and Identification Documents 
 37 
speaking, passive tags have less read range than active tags. Despite the non-alert and 
read range security and privacy dilemma, read range and the ability to collect data 
simultaneous from multiple tags are the major advantages of the technology.120  
Tags are made to respond to specific communication protocols from readers and 
operate on specific frequencies controlled by international standards organization (ISO) 
and International Electrotechnical Commission (EIC) for interoperability.121 The four 
common passive tags used on U.S. ID applications are the ISO/EIC 14443 that operates 
at frequency of 13.56MHz, the ISO/EIC 15693 that also operates at frequency of 
13.56MHz, the Electronic Product Code Class-1 Generation-1 (EPC-1) that operates at a 
ultra-high frequency (UHF) of 860MHz-960MHz and the Electronic Product Code Class-
1 Gernatation-2 (EPC-2) that also operates at an UHF of 860MHz-960MHz (see Table 1).  
1. ISO/EIC 14443 
 ISO 14443 is a passive-read, short-range contactless smart tag operable with 
readers at a nominal read range of six inches or less.122 Tests have revealed, however, a 
potential read range of 30 feet.123 Measures, such as faraday cage, can reduce read range 
to a few millimeters. As of today, the data transfer rate, that is, the communications 
speed, for these tags is 106 kilobytes per second (kbps)124 with a storage capacity of up 
to 64KB.125 In addition, these tags support a unique identifier (UID), 64-bit mutual 
authentication and a 32-bit password to protect data.126 These tags apply encryption (e.g., 
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Data Encryption Standard [DES], 3-DES) as they are often used on valued ID 
applications with sensitive data/information, for example, U.S. e-passports or German 
national ID cards. 
2. ISO/EIC 15693 
 ISO/EIC 15693 is a vicinity-read, long-range contactless smart tag, which is 
operable with readers at a read range of three feet. No tests were evidenced to determine 
the potential read range, yet it is likely greater than its ISO/EIC 14443 cousin. As of 
today, the data transfer rate for these tags is up to 53 kbps127 and a storage capacity up to 
8KB.128 In addition, these tags support 64-bit UID, 64-bit mutual authentication and a 
16-bit password to protect data,129 and are capable of encryption. They are often used on 
less sensitive and short-duration ID applications, like ski resort IDs or patient IDs and 
thus, do not warrant the expense of encryption.130 
3. EPC-1 
 EPC-1 is a vicinity-read, long-range contactless smart tag with a read range of 20 
feet. No tests have yet determined the potential read range, though it is likely less than the 
upgraded EPC-2 tag (see below for potential range). As of today, the data transfer rate for 
these tags is up to 230 kbps, with a storage capacity of up to 96 bits.131 These tags apply 
a weak mutual authentication method, a binary tree algorithm.132 IDs that use this RFID 
solution—notably SENTRI, NEXUS, and FAST—only store a unique serial number for 
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identification and authentication purposes. Of note, most EPC-1 ID solutions are 
upgrading to EPC-2.133 
4. EPC-2 
 EPC-2 is a vicinity-read, long-range contactless smart tag with a read range of 30 
feet. Tests with commercially available equipment, however, revealed a read range of 
217 feet with a potential read range of 565 feet, albeit at an expense of $2,500.134 As of 
today, the data transfer rate for these tags is 640 kbps,135 which is fast considering the 
data transfer rate for the most advanced cell phone systems are 220 kbps (average 14.4 
kbps).136 The max storage capacity for these tags is currently 64KB.137 These tags 
support a more sophisticated method of mutual authentication (i.e., “Q” protocol: random 
number [0–15] algorithm) than EPC-1 tags with a 32-bit password to protect data.138 IDs 
that use this RIFD solution store unique serial numbers for identification and 
authentication purposes (e.g., EDL, PASS card), thus, do not require the full capabilities 
of EPC-2 technology. The tag on the EDL, for example, has 256 bits of memory all of 
which has a specific purpose. Of note, EPC-2 is capable of 3-DES, yet it is an expensive 
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 ISO/EIC 14443 ISO/EIC 15693 EPC-1 EPC-2 
Password 32-bit 16-bit 8-bit 32-bit 
Mutual Auth. 64-bit 64-bit Binary Q-Protocol 
Comm. Speed 106 kbps 53 kbps 230 kbps 640 kbps 
Memory 64KB 8KB 96-bit 64KB 
Intended Range 6 inches 3 feet 20 feet 30 feet 
Encryption Yes Optional No No (Capable) 
Table 2.   Tag Comparison 
D. TECHNOLOGY CONCERNS FOR THE RFID-ENABLED EDL 
The major concern for EDLs with an EPC-2 tag, though complex, is the method 
of mutual authentication. Researchers, in fact, have suggested it is a naïve method of 
mutual authentication,140 which allows any malicious reader conforming to EPC 
standards to communicate with the EDL’s tag. Without encryption to scramble data, 
therefore, the EDL’s serial numbers are susceptible to malicious readers. Applying 
encryption technology, however, would make an inexpensive tag more expensive.141 
Still, “it is not impossible today to get low cost, long range, high speed passive RFID tags 
with encryption and high security.”142 
 Although the EDL’s data is relatively secure from tampering with a 32-bit 
password, it does not apply encryption or other “lightweight” cryptology methods 
researchers have proposed to protect data from malicious readers that could be done 
without increasing the expense of the tag.143 The ID, thus, is the weakest link, as the 
security offered by the system does not blanket the tag. The EPC tags do, however, have 
a read-only TID feature that may be used as an authentication tool. The TID helps to 
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ensure the EDL is not fraudulent, yet it is not a cryptographic countermeasure to protect 
RFID serial numbers from malicious readers.144 
 Because malicious readers can establish communication and read the RFID serial 
numbers on EDLs, the key concerns are cloning (creating a duplicate tag/ID), skimming 
(covertly copying or reading the unique RFID serial number), tracking (identifying when 
and where a tag is located based on the location of a reader), and profiling (discriminating 
based on a demographic).145 Each of the categories has specific threats either to security, 
privacy, or both. Each are describe in depth below to include the concerns related to the 
EDL.  
1. Cloning  
Cloning is the ability to copy the RFID serial number from the EPC-2 tags on 
EDLs and use it to “spoof” systems—in this case, to undermine border security by 
tricking border control readers into accepting an illicitly duplicated ID. Cloning is a 
known weakness of RFID.146 In a 2009 demonstration for example, a researcher driving 
around San Francisco demonstrated how easy it is to clone EPC-2 tags with $250 in off-
the-shelf Motorola reading equipment.147 In fact, EPC readers are readily available for 
purchase on the open market, including devices for cell phones and USB devices under 
$200 for laptops.148 Of course, the EPC was intended to supplant barcode technology, 
which means it is readily read by design. To some extent, this readability is offset by “kill 
passwords” for EPC tags that, ironically, are for privacy or security.149 EDL tags are, 
however, designed with such measures as specific mutual authentication key code 
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methods built in; thus, not just any off-the-self device will be able to read the serial 
numbers from EDLs. 
The security countermeasure on EPC-2 tags is the TID serial number embedded 
on the tag, which was not evidenced on earlier tested EDLs, in which TIDs were 
generic.150 The TID, however, is not an anti-cloning mechanism. The TID, in fact, could 
be cloned as easily as the RFID serial number.151 Yet, the cloner would likely need to 
obtain a tag with a programmable TID to fully clone or counterfeit the EDL. Companies 
are not likely to sell tags with programmable TIDs—unless one considers a state 
sponsored actor. Tags are built in many nations to include China, Malaysia and 
Taiwan.152 Still, the TIDs do make it difficult for hackers or terrorists to clone an EPC-2 
tag to subvert border security. 
Long-read range may, however, be a problem if both the serial number and TID 
can be cloned.153 The RFID in the EDL, for example, could be disabled to allow another 
RFID system to broadcast the appropriate signals from within the appropriate read-range 
while presenting a fraudulent EDL. The weakness, therefore, will require other security 
countermeasures such as driver’s license plate technology at the borders. Detecting 
cloned tags is, however, a possibility.154 
E-passports, in comparison to EDLs, use cryptographic overlays rather than the 
TID feature to ensure the ID is authentic and to prevent cloning.155 Between passive 
(digital signature of issuing nation) and active authentication (digital signature of 
passport), the cryptographic features provide confidence that the passport belongs to the 
individual presenting it. Combined, they are a formidable means of preventing fraudulent 
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IDs. Importantly, the e-passport is a critical component of the security system (see Table 
2). 
 
E-Passport Security  Enhanced Driver’s License Security  
Short-range RFID technology  Long-range RFID technology  
Designed for privacy & security Designed for cheap cost, speed & range 
Basic Access Controls to lock & unlock   
Non-Traceable Chip  
Passive Authentication  
Active Authentication  
Extended Access Control  
RFID shielding (continuous protection) Protective sleeve (random protection) 
Table 3.   E-Passport Security vs. EDL Security 
2. Skimming 
Skimming is the unauthorized access or capture of the EDL’s unique RFID serial 
number for illicit reasons.156 The user’s RFID serial number could, for example, facilitate 
identity theft if the unique serial number is tied to a database with other PII. The threat of 
skimming EPC-2 tags, like cloning, has been confirmed by researchers,157 as is the use of 
unique identifiers, for example, Social Security numbers, to facilitate identity theft.158 
Another concern associated with skimming is the ability to aggregate RFID serial 
numbers to understand individual predilections.159 If tagged repeatedly at enough 
locations, for example, individualized EDLs serial numbers could reveal sexual 
preferences, religious affiliations, political affiliations, spending preferences, 
entertainment preferences, and other predilections. Although this prospect seems far-
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fetched, the motivations for doing so are evidenced today by such on-line businesses as 
Google or Facebook160 and such retailers as Walmart or CVS161 that seek to streamline 
business dynamics to customer preferences—and collect volumes of information on 
customers to do it.  
The DHS’s countermeasure for skimming is a protective sleeve (see Figure 8) and 
privacy awareness training.162 As long as EDLs remain in the sleeve, the signal is 
negligible—less than ten inches. Crumpled sleeves do, however, affect the read range, 
making the EDL readable up to 20 inches.163 The DHS is concerned about skimming, 
including REAL ID driver’s licenses (with no RFID), and has encouraged states to 
address these issues through state statutes.164 
 
 
Figure 9.  Protective Sleeve. (From 3M.) 
A complicating factor in using EPC-2 tags on EDLs and other EPC-2 IDs is their 
original purpose, to replace barcodes. Specifically, more incentives for developing or 
fabricating skimming technology exit as a result of the rich business environment that 
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exists around the tags. This same deficiency could, however, be a blessing in disguise. 
The business world is also concerned about others hacking EPC-2 technology for 
intelligence (for instance, a business seeking to better understand the competition) or 
sabotage (for example, spoofing orders to customers).165 Thus, the technology used in 
EDLs should improve alongside the business world, although ID cards are in circulation 
longer than most commercial products with EPC-2 tags. 
Another complicating factor in using EPC-2 tags on EDLs is the long read range 
combined with the multipurpose nature of a driver’s license. Driver’s licenses are used in 
multiple situations, to include but not limited to, verification of signature for credit card 
purchases, proof of identity during a traffic stop, proof of identity for some air travel, and 
proof of identity when conducting such business as financial transactions or real estate 
transactions. Thus, the EDL’s long-range signal will be exposed more often than other 
IDs, not least because the EDL must come out of its protective sleeve more often. In 
contrast, other border control IDs can be left in the protective sleeve or placed on a shelf 
or in glove box until needed with less concern. 
3. Tracking 
Tracking is the ability to discern an EDL’s RFID serial number by location.166 
Although the signal can be triangulated,167 the ability to discern location based on the 
tags read range and reader location is most compelling.168 A concern today, for example, 
is the tracking of employees in the workplace by employers.169 Since EDLs are 
multipurpose and discernable beyond U.S. land borders – for example, Canada and 
Mexico – it stands to reason, then, that many entities will have the potential to track U.S. 
citizens. It goes without saying that foreign governments have an interest in U.S. interests 
and people. 
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Some contend that the U.S. government could use ability to skim and collect 
serial numbers simultaneously to track masses of people.170 The fear of such “Big 
Brother” tracking is referred to as a chilling effect.171 Specifically, it may cause citizens 
refrain from such political activities as rallies or protests, because they believe that if 
tagged the government may retaliate.  
Another fear associated with tracking is the potential for blackmail. Blackmail 
involves coercing an individual by threatening to expose a secret—a sexual preference, 
an affair—which often involves hush money.172 Blackmail could also include other 
“payments,” such as prevailing on a Congressman to vote against his beliefs or his 
constituency’s interests to keep his dirty laundry well hidden.  
4. Profiling 
With the ability to skim and discern EDL RFID serial numbers, the ultimate fear 
is profiling or discriminating. The example studies site is IBM’s “Margaret Program,” in 
which RFID-enabled IDs gave bank employees in Britain early warning of affluent 
customers entering their facility.173 Thus, the rich were receiving better service than the 
less affluent. Theoretically, therefore, RFID-enabled IDs could facilitate many other 
types of discrimination based on other demographics—age, gender, ethnicity, and 
political affiliation—especially if on a common ID. 
E. A TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON OF IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 
The EDL includes the technological features of a regular driver’s license, which 
commonly includes 2D barcode and/or magnetic stripe (see Figure 9). Driver’s license 
technologies are approved and standardized by the AAMVA and are designed to store 
and encode data, as well as to facilitate state database queries and to help prevent 
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counterfeiting and fraud.174 With such measures already in place, one might raise the 
question of whether RFID technology is even necessary. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Driver’s License Technologies. (From TOKENWORKS.) 
Since all ID technologies have substantial memory capacity to hold a unique 
identifier, the fundamental question is whether other machine-readable technologies have 
similar or superior security features with the ability to authenticate, that is, the function 
the TID provides. Alternative technologies abound, but the most common are the 
barcode, the magnetic stripe, and the Smart Card. How does each stack up against RFID? 
1. Barcode 
 Barcode technology is the most popular method for encoding personal 
information on a driver’s license. The technology is capable of storing up to 32KB—
China has proprietary rights on this design—but only 1.5KB (data matrix design) or 1KB 
(PDF 417) under U.S. property rights. Title 6 CFR 37.19 recognizes ISO/IEC 
15438:2006(E) for REAL ID driver’s licenses, which is PDF 417 barcode design.175 
Immediately, therefore, RFID is superior in terms of potential storage capacity. 
The primary purpose of barcodes is to encode the information that is already on 
the driver’s license for quick mechanical scanning, as well as to provide quick access to 
state databases from authorized terminals if necessary. Although a reader is required to 
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discern information stored on a barcode, the hardware and software systems to do so can 
be found on the Internet.176 Reading speed is approximately four seconds.177 Compared 
to the much faster RFID, thus, the barcode technology has less storage capacity, less 
security potential, and less privacy potential. RFID, thus, is superior. 
2. Magnetic Stripe 
 Magnetic stripe is a popular encoding technology for driver’s licenses, yet Title 6 
CFR 37.19 does not recognize it; it is optional for state purposes. Magnetic stripe 
typically has three tracks that hold 79 bits, 40 bits, and 107 bits respectively.178 The 
technology as applied to driver’s licenses, like barcodes, is designed for interoperability 
and ease of use and as such, can be accessed easily. Magnetic stripe technology, however, 
is capable of 3-DES and authentication that is approved by the federal government to 
secure sensitive data.179 
Despite the security potential of the technology, the magnetic stripe is susceptible 
to wear and tear and can be copied easily, for instance, to create a duplicate ID. PIN 
codes are a countermeasure, though because PIN codes take time to enter, commerce 
would be severely impacted if instituted for border security or other commerce-related 
activities (e.g., scan barcode, retrieve PIN, enter PIN, and thereby authenticate ID). 
Magnetic stripe, thus, does not rise to the capabilities offered by RFID solutions. 
3. Smart Card - Contact Technology 
Smart Card (see Figure 10) is not a technology currently used on U.S. driver’s 
licenses; however, it is a technology that could be applied to IDs, for example, military 
ID cards, and thus, can be applied to driver’s licenses. Smart Cards are embedded 
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microprocessors that are currently capable of containing over 200KB of electrically 
erasable and programmable read only memory (EEPROM), over 16KB of random access 
memory (RAM), and over 380KB of random operating memory (ROM).180 Like 
magnetic stripe and RFID, the technology can support 3-DES and authentication. 
There are three major drawbacks for this technology in comparison to RFID. 
Specifically, it is slightly more expensive, slower than RFID, more susceptible to wear 
and tear, and international interoperability standards have yet to be established.181 
Nevertheless, the technology could be employed that would alleviate the privacy 




Figure 11.  Contact Smart Card. (From The University of Chicago Department of 
Computer Science.) 
F. OTHER TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS 
An important consideration that should be made when assessing technologies on a 
common ID like the driver’s license is expandability, that is, memory capacity. The 
ICAO, for example, established RFID technology as the international norm on e-
passports for the purpose of storing the biometric facial image capture—quality images 
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take as much as 4KB of memory—and PII, for example, name, citizenship.182 As of late, 
neither REAL ID nor WHTI requires biometrics to be stored electronically on the 
driver’s license, though future security requirements may demand it. 
Another technological consideration for a common ID like the driver’s license is 
duration of use. Specifically, driver’s licenses are typically in service for five or more 
years. REAL ID authorizes up to eight years, which is three years beyond the authorized 
life of other border IDs. As such, the technology employed on or within the driver’s 
license may become increasingly susceptible to fraudulent activity as the technology 
ages. The RFID currently employed on EDLs, for example, could become further 
susceptible to cloning, skimming, and tracking as the technologies to do these activities 
become more sophisticated than the technology embedded in the driver’s license. Thus, 
the need to ensure the technology is solid or flexible enough to support future changes if 
necessary. 
Lastly, it is important to recall that the value of the driver’s license is much 
greater than most other IDs in terms of the access it gives the bearer to myriad daily 
activities beyond plying the nation’s roadways. As such, the technology should be 
sophisticated enough to resist counterfeiting. The e-passport, for example, is ostensibly 
secured by sophisticated technology because of the PII stored on it. Yet because PII is in 
plain view on the passport, it is largely a function of security and/or preventing those who 
would seek to counterfeit it. The same holds true for a driver’s license, as they too are 
desirable IDs to obtain and perhaps greater as a result of branding them “enhanced.” 
G. THE TAKE-AWAY AND SOLUTION 
 Based on the bits and bytes of this chapter, several technological aspects of the 
current EDL are evident. First, RFID is the favored technology for good reason, as it is a 
reliable and inexpensive technology with a wealth of capabilities. Second, RFID offers 
optional degrees of security and read-range. Third, EPC-2 technology is susceptible to 
cloning, profiling, skimming, and tracking by malicious readers without encryption. 
Fourth, a state driver’s license is more susceptible to cloning, profiling, skimming and 
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tracking as a result of applying a long read-range technology to a common and multiuse 
state driver’s license. Fifth, the use of EPC-2 technology on an inherently valuable ID in 
circulation for potentially eight years is precarious. The solution to these issues: adopt a 
short-range encrypted RFID and/or Smart Card solution with some additional capacity to 
support future changes if necessary. 
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IV. PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 
The aspect of the EDL that has received the most attention is the impact to 
individual privacy. Much of the literature consists of anecdotes or unempirical 
presumptions from EDL critics. Thus, an examination of privacy is needed to fill the gap 
in the literature. More useful would be a comparative analysis of the EDL’s current 
technology with an improved encrypted short-range RFID or Smart Card solution, 
expressly, it will help gauge if the updated technology offers the solution to privacy 
concerns. Importantly, the analysis will reinforce the need for a new technical solution 
not only for the security reasons identified in the previous chapter, but also for privacy 
reasons.  
A. THE PRIVACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATE 
The DHS’s approval of EDLs continues to receive criticism from privacy 
advocates and others warning of the dangers posed to individual privacy.183 The focus is 
on the DHS’s use of vicinity-read RFID, which detractors write off as unsecure, 
unnecessary, and uncontrollable.184 Yet, the matter runs deeper. Some, for example, 
assert the technology may be a “sheep in wolf’s clothing.”185 The inference is that the 
technology could be used for the Orwellian purpose of tracking for government or 
corporate desires associated with power, control, or greed. Further implied is that 
psychological mechanisms—social proof, liking, authority, commitment and 
consistency186—and other “Pavlovian” mechanisms as the media touting the benefits and 
convenience are purposefully designed to erode society’s expectation of privacy to 
facilitate the process.187 
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For the EDL, thus, the heart of the matter concerns power. Anytime the U.S. 
government expands NIDS such as the EDL or other ID systems, it further diminishes the 
privacy and autonomy of its citizens and thereby shifts power away from its citizens.188 
The EDL, to include REAL ID, does expand NIDS. Specifically, U.S. citizens register, 
that is, share PII for an individualized government folder stored in a database, which then 
allows for additional information derived from the RFID or facial biometric surveillance 
systems to be added to that or another electronic folder—for example, border crossing 
location, time, date. There follows the subsequent ability to share or analyze this data to 
help “connect the dots.”189 The multi-purpose nature of a driver’s license, combined with 
the capabilities of long-range RFID adds to the “unknown” element. 
Fundamentally, the more information that is gathered and the more individualized 
folders the U.S. government may access and analyze, the less privacy and autonomy 
citizens have.190 Expressly, citizens become more and more “boxed-in” with less privacy 
or autonomy—in a society that honors these rights as much as possible. At the same time, 
however, there is a need for identification systems in a society or world in which evils 
like terrorism and crime exist, especially when society has an expectation that 
government will provide some level of security against these threats. Likewise, healthy 
societies require some level of compliance, participation, and legitimacy that is often 
referred to as social control.191 
Because identification, security, and social control are necessary, a balance must 
be struck between civil liberties and these other goals that are agreeable to society as a 
whole. The government has a significant responsibility in this process, which is to ensure 
that civil liberties are preserved as much as possible. Arguably, the government has done 
this. When Americans’ favor of a national ID tipped over the 50-percent threshold after 
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9/11,192 for example, the government could have developed legislation for a national 
ID.193 The federal government instead developed and enacted the IRTPA, while 
conceded some power under REAL ID, to tighten driver’s license standards without 
imposing a unitary national ID requirement. Albeit not a perfect law, REAL ID is a much 
more agreeable solution than a national ID card that must be carried on person at all 
times—particularly with more than a decade of relative domestic tranquility since the 
9/11 attacks to temper the fervor for stricter national ID standards. 
A key component of the civil liberties and national security debate is the 
concession of power. The public’s power or trust in government is something that the 
government can draw on in times when national security is threatened. The lower the 
level of trust, the less likely the government is able to succeed.194 Implicit is that a 
compromise exists.195 Thus, the debate is often cast in the conventional terms of national 
security versus civil liberties, on the assumption that as support for civil liberties 
increases, support for order and security decreases, and vice-versa.196 Yet, one also might 
argue that civil liberties and security are not necessarily at odds. National security, itself, 
fosters civil liberties by providing the context for the stability and prosperity in which 
personal freedoms can reach their highest levels.   
Because security does provide the context for personal freedoms to reach their 
highest levels, a tension will persist that government must contend with. The latest U.S. 
poll, unlike directly after 9/11, for example, indicates that the protection of rights and 
freedoms is more important to Americans than security.197 The Pew Research Center also 
indicates a 7-percent increase from 2004 and 2009 in public attitudes favoring the 
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protection of civil liberties.198 Without a clear and present national security threat on the 
proverbial horizon, thus, citizens of a democracy naturally reset their preferences to 
reflect the innate distrust of a large, intrusive state apparatus, even if it calls itself 
“security.” At some point, therefore, the government must abdicate power back to the 
public, as necessary, or risk a popular dissent. 
Since security and civil liberties are not necessarily at odds, security systems or 
methods must be closely scrutinized whenever it is inferred that civil liberties are 
threatened. Given the RFID-enabled EDL privacy debate, thus, an opportunity exists to 
peel back the layers to determine if an unnecessary concession of power exists under the 
guise of security. Importantly, analysis will provide a greater understanding of the 
privacy issues and, if necessary, mitigate them. Striking the perfect balance between 
privacy and national security, however, is more of an art than a science as either end can 
be jumped on to pull against the other. Because the fundamental argument made by 
privacy advocates is that the long-range RFID of an EDL is a threat to the right to 
privacy, the right must be assessed to determine if greater protections are necessary to 
preserve privacy. The right to privacy, however, exists on two planes, specifically at the 
Constitutional level for state concerns and at the tort level for private entity concerns.  
1. The Constitutional Right to Privacy vs. RFID  
The right to privacy is not in the Constitution nor is it clearly spelled out in the 
Bill of Rights as, for example, the right to a fair trial or the freedom of assembly is. It has 
culminated, as a legal concept, in the last century as a right from such articles of the Bill 
of Rights as the First Amendment (privacy of beliefs), the Third Amendment (privacy of 
home), the Fourth Amendment (privacy of person and possessions), and more generally 
the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.199 
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Scholars cite Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis as the first jurists to 
articulate the legal theory of privacy in an 1890 Harvard Law Review article.200  Coining 
the phrase “the right to be let alone” by paraphrasing Thomas Cooley, 201 Warren and 
Brandeis argue laws should protect an individual from unwarranted invasions by the 
state.202 Little has changed in this basic interpretation. The courts have generally agreed 
that American citizens are protected from unreasonable invasions of privacy by the state. 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,203 which provides a woman’s 
right to choose the abortion of her child during the first trimester, exemplifies the right to 
privacy particularly as it relates to Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment.204 
The ambiguity about the right to privacy, however, has made it “a concept in 
disarray as it seems to be about everything, and therefore it appears to be about 
nothing.”205 The incursion of technology in the last few decades has only added to the 
disarray.206 In fact, the dynamic nature of technology has generated debate as to whether 
the courts or legislatures are in the best position to protect privacy. Expressly, the “courts 
have a difficult time keeping pace with technological change, and statutory schemes can 
quickly become outdated.”207 Nonetheless, both have been integral to shaping the right 
alongside technological development. 
In dealing with state invasions of privacy from technology, the Fourth 
Amendment is the bedrock of “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated…”208 The key word is unreasonable, as it implies an interpretation, in the last 
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instance by a court, may be necessary. In fact, several technological advancements used 
by the state to facilitate prosecution have necessitated the court’s interpretation of the 
right to privacy. The problem, in large part, is due to technological advancements used 
beyond their intended purpose for surveillance, for example, tracking through various 
technologies. 
In Kyllo v. United States, for example, the court found that law enforcement 
requires a warrant before using a thermal-imaging device to detect heat patterns 
emanating from a person’s home.209 Similarly, in United States v. Karo the court 
believed it necessary for law enforcement to obtain a warrant before using a beeper to 
monitor the movements of persons while in their home.210  The threshold is much higher 
outside of home. In United States v. Knotts, for example, court believed that the law 
enforcement’s use of a beeper for tracking merely augmented their ability to do 
something that was visually observable in public.211 
Implicit is that technology develops before the right to privacy is a concern and 
that the technology itself is not the automatic nemesis of privacy. In fact, most 
technologies—for example, beepers, RFID, global positioning systems (GPS)—are not 
developed for the purpose of invading privacy. It is only after technologies are developed 
that humans find ways to use them intentionally or unintentionally to undermine the right 
to privacy. Legislatures and courts, therefore, are typically plugging gaps in order to 
protect the right to privacy. 
An important element for the right to privacy is the subjective interpretation, 
which is based on what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In Katz v. United 
States,212 for example, the Supreme Court ruled warrantless wiretapping by the state 
violates the Fourth Amendment. The decision, however, was not strictly based on the 
Fourth Amendment. It also included a subjective element or what society was prepared to 
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accept as reasonable at that time.213 It is implied, therefore, that as societies attitudes 
change, so too do court interpretations and legislative (re)actions.  
 It is generally understood that social attitudes toward privacy are continually 
flattened the by the influx of technology (often a function of convenience). The erosion 
of privacy is “a process through which a technology’s gradual growth is followed by the 
perpetuation of an unforeseen invasive aspect that is shrugged off as the inevitable price 
of progress.”214 The more technologies interact with humans, therefore, the more erosion 
that can or will take place. Explicitly, the privacy threshold is continually increasing 
along side society, which is why some have argued for a “bright line” or clear parameters 
to protect privacy.215 
2. Common Law Tort Right to Privacy vs. RFID 
Although the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) permits RFID users 
to self-regulate,216 individuals have a legal right to privacy so long as two elements are 
satisfied. First, the information used must be “highly offensive or objectionable to a 
reasonable man,” and second, “the thing into which there is prying or intrusion is entitled 
to be, private.”217 Restatement protects individuals from “intentional intrusion, physically 
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns… 
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.”218 
In tort, the motivations for RFID users to avoid violating privacy are monetary. 
Expressly, users can be sued or could lose business (or entirely) as a result of 
“backlash.”219 The class action lawsuit filed against Facebook for unlawfully monitoring 
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users even when they were not on-line is an example.220 The “highly offensive” mark in 
court, however, could be a high hurdle for prosecutors. In Dwyer v. American Express, 
for example, the court did not hold the company liable for data-mining the plaintiff’s 
spending patterns and selling it to merchants.221 
With the ability to of RFID users to self-regulate and the challenges of tort law to 
redress privacy issues, there has been a call for federal legislation.222 To date, no federal 
legislation has been considered. Many states, however, have enacted laws on many 
different issues related to RFID.223 California, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin 
for example, prohibits requiring implantation of a RFID microchip. California, Nevada, 
and Washington prohibit unauthorized skimming. For EDLs, states have either adopted 
laws to accept, refuse, or place restrictions--so that only certain numbers can be issued, 
they must have encryption, no surveillance devices on highways, no compiling of data 
into a database, and no PII.224 
B. CONTEXTUAL EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT EDL 
When a new technology comes on-line, it must be defined in a specific context 
(tracking, profiling) and time (during a time of national emergency, peace) to evaluate 
privacy.225 The privacy issue associated with a new airport X-ray device that can see 
through people’s clothing, for example, is different than law enforcement using RFID-
enabled ID for tracking. Even then, however, the contextual situation may be 
unreasonable but necessary, particularly when it is for the purpose of national security. 
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Thus, the quote “the inevitable price of progress”226 should be expanded to include “the 
inevitable price of progress or national security.” 
Because the EDL is used in multiple contexts, it is necessary to evaluate both the 
state (Constitutional) and private (tort) concerns. Although privacy concerns could be 
explicit, such as tracking inside or outside of the home, the general contextual concern 
will suffice. Specifically, the laws associated with privacy are applicable in all contexts—
both in and outside the home—and it is only the interpretation or weight of the privacy 
invasion that is of significance. 
1. State Concerns 
The major common-law concern about the long-range RFID-enabled EDL is the 
ability of the state to track U.S. citizens without consent or a warrant. Given that RFID 
can be triangulated or narrowed down to a read range,227 tracking is well possible—and 
represents a privacy concern. 
The concern about the state tracking U.S. citizens without consent or a warrant 
assumes EDLs will be as effective or more effective than other means of electronic 
tracking. Beepers—cell phone technology—and GPS offer a much more effective means 
of tracking.228 To assume, thus, that the state would prefer to track EDLs is dubious. 
After all, EDLs transmit at best 217 feet when exposed.229 They do, however, provide the 
potential to track the card in perpetuity; once the state-issued EDL is voluntarily bought, 
ownership is transferred to the individual. In fact, the August 14, 2012 federal court 
ruling in U.S v. Skinner allowing law enforcement to track cell phones without a warrant 
based on their “inherent external locatability” could also be applied to EDLs.230 The 
protective sleeve, however, would likely require the state to generate reasons for the EDL 
to be exposed and as such, it is likely more trouble than it’s worth.  
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Scholars have noted that law enforcement has a knack for keeping up with new 
tracking technologies, which “invigorate in-house solutions that are kept secret.”231 Thus, 
it is unknown whether a technology will be developed to make RFID-enabled EDLs a 
viable tracking alternative. Either way, legal standards (Kyllo v. United States, United 
States v. Karo) and laws (the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the 
Electronic Communications Protection Act of 1986) provide legal guidance and/or a 
recourse to abuses if the state uses RFID emitted from EDLs for the purpose of tracking 
albeit base on societies eroding expectation of privacy at that time.  
Beyond individual tracking is the ability of the state to use RFID-enabled EDLs to 
facilitate mass tracking. While this eventuality is plausible, granted that RFID can be 
tracked at multiple locations, given the amount of digital data humans produce, this 
proposition, too, is doubtful. It is far easier and more advantageous to collect information 
or data from other systems, for example banking records, telephone records, Internet 
blogs, for all of which legal protocols exist, albeit stressed by new challenges.232 
Moreover, EDLs are not, as of late, mandatory or pervasive. Admittedly, however, EDLs 
are a mechanism for mass validation for the purpose of border control that is closely 
related to mass tracking. Thus, there remains the notion that EDLs could be used for this 
purpose. 
2. Tort Concerns  
There are three major tort-related concerns for the RFID-enabled EDL. The first 
is the ability of the RFID users to acquire the EDLs RFID number for the purpose of 
identity theft or understanding individual predilections. Given EDLs use an unencrypted 
EPC tag that emits a unique serial number tied to a database, this is a plausible contextual 
situation. The second is the ability of RFID users to conduct tracking. The third is the 
ability to profile, which is also possible with a unique RFID serial number. 
The concern that the EDLs unique number, similar to the Social Security Number, 
will facilitate identity theft assumes RFID numbers will become commonplace and, thus, 
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used in multiple systems. Because RFID numbers are unlikely to propagate beyond 
secure systems,233 the notion that it will become as pervasive as SSNs is dubious; serial 
numbers will also change when new driver’s license is issued. Section 18 USC 2721 
does, however, have 14 permissible reasons for the PII to be disclosed from vehicle 
databases234 that, arguably, have degrees of trustworthiness. Either way, it is a potential 
threat and one that has federal protections under The Driver Privacy Protection Act of 
1994 and The Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998.235 Thus, a 
legal recourse for abuse exists should the RFID number facilitate this activity. The 
building of profiles from serial numbers to understand individual predilections, however, 
is a concern as the legal recourse is suspect. 236 
The concern that EDLs will facilitate tracking by private entities does not hold 
much water as long as EDLs do not become pervasive. Private entities are more likely to 
tag and track products than risk a potential privacy invasion of tracking EDLs, which 
could destroy their business. Business and individuals who deal with people, however, 
could be of some concern--for example, a private investigator or an insurance company. 
As noted earlier, there are no federally enforceable RFID laws to control the tracking 
actions of businesses and private individuals.237 The DHS has, however, encouraged 
states to deal with this potential issue and some have done so. 
The final concern that EDLs facilitate profiling has foundation, yet it is unlikely 
to take off as a result of a covert undertaking. Expressly, EDLs are not yet common or 
mandatory and as such, they would be of little value as a discriminator. It is far more 
likely that users will facilitate this activity if does occur. For example, users could allow 
entities like banks, clubs, or businesses to record their RFID number for the purpose of 
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receiving perks—better service or establishing credit. The point is that it is less of a 
privacy issue and more of an ethical issue if it does occur.  
C. DOES THE IMPROVED EDL ADDRESS PRIVACY CONCERNS? 
Although some of the privacy concerns of the EDL with its current technology are 
debatable, some are not. The question, therefore, is whether or not a short-range 
encrypted and/or Smart Card technology offers a better solution for the EDL. There are 
two levels that must be assessed. The first is state-level concerns, expressly; it is only 
through state support that an improved driver’s license will be feasible. The second, and 
no less important, is the individual privacy concerns. Although individual privacy 
concerns could be separated into state and tort concerns, the overlap in similarities makes 
it unnecessary. 
1. State Concerns 
As noted, some states have either denied or placed legal restrictions on EDL to 
include: only certain numbers can be issued; must have encryption; no surveillance 
devices on highways; no compiling of data into a database; and no PII on EDL.238 Each, 
therefore, must be assessed with the proposed technological changes with the exception 
of the need for encryption as it is applied to the solution. The question is whether or not 
the remaining privacy concerns are addressed with an encrypted short-range or Smart 
Card EDL. 
Beginning with the notion that only a certain number of EDL’s can be issued; this 
ostensibly is a need to lessen the erosion of privacy or to ensure the EDL does not 
become pervasive to encourage privacy invasions or a national ID. Since an encrypted 
short-range or Smart Card EDL offers more security and privacy than even REAL ID 
compliant driver’s licenses, the state concern is addressed. Further, the EDL could remain 
a state function that is audited and as such, the national ID not amplified beyond REAL 
ID compliant driver’s licenses. The new solution(s), thus, addresses state concerns. 
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The “no surveillance devices on highways” notion is a consequence of the long-
range RFID currently used on EDLs. The belief is that long-range RFID will facilitate 
surveillance or become an overt or covert E-Z Pass-like system to track U.S. citizens on 
highways.239 The encrypted short-range or Smart Card solution nullifies the concern. The 
solution also addresses the “compiling of data into a database” as it too is a consequence 
of long-range RFID, for example, a person or entity clandestinely skimming RFID 
numbers. Thus, the encrypted short-range RFID and/or Smart Card solution addresses 
both state concerns. 
The final state concern of “no PII on the EDL” is a little tricky. The DHS has 
indicated that privacy risks are mitigated because no PII is stored on the RFID tag.240 The 
definition of PII by the U.S. Department of Commerce, however, suggests that the 
RFID’s unique serial numbers are in fact PII because “it can distinguish an individual, 
trace an individual, and is linked to information about an individual.”241 Nonetheless, the 
serial numbers are no different than the exposed driver’s license number and, thus, the 
new solution(s) does address the state concern, not to mention it is more secure than an 
exposed driver’s license number. 
2. Individual Concerns 
Individual concerns of an unencrypted long-range RFID-enabled EDL can be 
framed under the following potential issues: tracking; identity theft; skimming serial 
numbers to understand individual predilections; and profiling. The question is whether or 
not an encrypted short-range or Smart Card technical solution will address each of these 
concerns. 
The first concern of tracking is, in large part, a function of the EDL’s long-range 
RFID. Since the proposed short-range RFID or Smart Card solution brings the signal to 
                                                 
239 "Title XX Transportation: Chapter 236 Highway Regulation, Protection and Control Regulations: 
Highway Video Surveillance." New Hampshire General Court, 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/XX/236/236-130.htm (Accessed September 20, 2012). 
240 Manaher, Privacy Impact Assessment for the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
Technology for Border Crossings, 23. 
241 Erika McCallister, Tim Grance and Karen Scarfone, "Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)," NIST, U.S. Department of Commerce 800-122 (April, 2012): 2-
1. 
 66 
less than what can be visually observed, the notion of tracking is absolved. The short-
range RFID solution does, even with encryption, have a latent ability to track that gives 
slightly more credence to the Smart Card solution. An RFID on/off switch, however, 
could be a solution to entertain solely the RFID technical solution and may support a 
slightly greater read-range. 
The second concern of identity theft is a consequence of the EDL’s unencrypted 
long-range RFID and as such, the new solution addresses this concern. Encrypted EDLs, 
in fact, close the loop to ensure all systems securely protect PII. Some of the PII that is 
visually observable on the EDL could actually be supported by the technology to further 
reduce the likelihood of identity theft. Importantly, the new solution severely reduces the 
ability to counterfeit, as serial numbers are secure and controlled by states. 
The third and fourth concerns of skimming and profiling are a function of the 
unencrypted signal and long-range RFID. Since the proposed solution is encrypted and 
short range and/or Smart Card, both of these concerns are nullified. Thus, an encrypted 
short-range RFID and/or Smart Card solution address individual privacy concerns. 
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V. ASSESSING THE EDL 
 This chapter reinforces the need for an encrypted short-range RFID or Smart Card 
technological solution to support the voluntary EDL. It also reinforces the notion that the 
new solution(s) should be adopted nationwide to reduce the growing epidemic of 
counterfeit drivers licenses. It also demonstrates that the EDL, with the appropriate 
technology, offers more capabilities than REAL ID compliant driver’s license and 
supports the notion that the EDL, with the appropriate technology, is less invasive on 
state and individual rights and could liberate many, if not all, of the IDs in support of the 
WHTI to reduce several NIDS. 
A. POLITICAL ASSESSMENT 
An encrypted short-range RFID and/or Smart Card EDL has the potential to be 
less invasive on state and individual rights beyond the ability to protect Fourth 
Amendment privacy established in Chapter IV. What has yet to be addressed is how. The 
subsections below will answer this question for the concerns identified in Chapter II, 
which consist of the following: Tenth Amendment concerns; First Amendment concerns 
and biometrics; restrictions on commercial air travel; national ID concerns; and privacy 
risks at the system level. 
1. Tenth Amendment Concerns 
Any federal mandate that imposes requirements on the states, particularly those 
that have been assigned to the state by the Constitution under the Tenth Amendment,242 
will be met with resistance, as the IRTPA and REAL ID revealed. Since the driver’s 
license and identification card process is a state function, the federal government must 
respect state autonomy when developing legislation and the Executive must exercise 
discretion during interpretation of law. Printz vs. United States,243 for example, confirms 
the federal government cannot impose a regulatory program, even if temporary, that is 
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granted to a State. Since REAL ID is not compulsory, the Tenth Amendment is not 
violated and in a greater sense, the federal government is seeking support to bolster 
national security without resorting to a unitary national ID. 
The fundamental question then is: how does an encrypted short-range RFID 
and/or Smart Card EDL better support the Tenth Amendment? The answer resides in the 
fact that EDL authentication can take place through state systems. Importantly, the EDL 
is currently and would remain a state and not a federal ID. States also control the designs 
of EDLs. Centralized authority over personal identity at the federal level, thus, is 
unnecessary. As a win-win, the federal government retains the ability to authenticate 
identity over secure systems “controlled and audited” by states. 
 If the EDL were to be adopted nationwide, it could alleviate the necessity of 
other, if not all, IDs in support of the WHTI to more emphasize state level ID systems. 
Privileges, such as speed lanes or commercial lanes, could be signified, if necessary, by 
other means. Removing WHITI IDs, in fact, will increase authentication checks of the 
EDL, and subsequently further reduce the likelihood of counterfeiting. Hence, an 
encrypted short-range RFID and/or Smart Card ID is less of an impact on the Tenth 
Amendment; could reduce Fourth Amendment privacy concerns of WHTI IDs; decreases 
the likelihood of counterfeits, and subsequently identity theft; increases national security; 
and has the potential to provide the freedom to traverse borders with a driver’s license 
once known before 9/11. 
2. First Amendment Concerns and Biometrics 
The core necessity for a biometric is to “authenticate” identity.”244 With an 
“authenticable” EDL used by U.S. citizens, thus, the requisite is minimized. Importantly, 
it would not be necessary to mandate one particular biometric for U.S. citizens issued an 
EDL. States, in fact, should not, as in New York vs. United States,245 be afforded minimal 
options by the federal government. Fingerprints, DNA, hand, optic scans, voice, and 
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signature, for example, are available biometrics that are as or more reliable.246 With 
options, therefore, U.S. citizens who do not want their photo taken for religious reasons 
could be afforded an alternative. Moreover, it would relieve some of the fear that the 
government is “tracking” U.S. citizens with video surveillance systems. Thus, an 
encrypted short-range RFID and/or Smart Card ID solution has the potential to offer 
greater First Amendment protections. Moreover, both solutions reduce the “chilling 
effect” of long-range RFID. 
3. Restrictions on Air Travel 
The recent adoption of Global Entry cards to support air travel indicates U.S. 
citizens issued an EDL could be afforded the same benefits. U.S. citizens issued EDLs, 
thus, need not be restricted to any mode of travel, to include air. If the EDL were adopted 
nationwide to upgrade REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses, in fact, all drivers’ licenses 
would be authenticable and the restriction on commercial air travel would no longer be of 
any consequence. Since state and individual concerns have been addressed with an 
encrypted short-range or Smart Card ID, it is a long-term possibility. Without change, 
however, the long-term possibility is lost. 
4. National ID Issues 
Any change to a state ID system will invigorate the national ID debate, which 
REAL ID revealed. The DHS has indicated that the federal government has no intention 
of creating a de facto national ID as a consequence of REAL ID.247 Database collection 
and information exchange, however, has made the need for national ID nearly moot as 
the underbelly of a formidable de facto NIDS already exists, especially when most 
activities, to include employment, are controlled by an ID system.248 Such laws as the 
Privacy Act of 1974 or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996  
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do, however, protect de facto NIDS from abuse. More importantly, the taboos associated 
with a national ID are too strong for Congress to entertain the idea of requiring all U.S. 
citizens to be carded. 
The underlying question is whether or not the adoption of an encrypted short-
range RFID and/or Smart Card EDL is a national ID concern. As a voluntary ID, no 
identifiable concerns are evident. The national ID debate will be heightened, however, if 
adopted nationwide despite the fact that the EDL is and would remain a state function. 
Nonetheless, driver’s licenses are a necessary ID system, are not mandatory, and already 
have and require machine-readable technology. Changing the type of technology, thus, 
has little to do with the national ID debate, which exists at the system level. The debate 
will fundamentally come down to the choices. Because RFID is RFID, the only viable 
secure and authenticable option is the Smart Card. Although more expensive to support 
two technical systems, having options does ring well with those who do not want to be 
imposed or outright fear RFID (RFID on/off switch may be a one technology solution). 
5. Privacy Risks at the System Level 
Converting to an encrypted short-range and/or Smart Card solution does not 
increase the privacy risks at the system level. By closing the security loop with an 
encrypted EDL, however, it does decrease the risks that can subvert the system to include 
privacy. Reducing and/or eliminating the number of IDs in support of the WHTI will also 
minimize system level risks. Importantly, adoption can only increase system-level 
protections and create other possibilities to further privacy protections. 
B. ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
 Any change in technology to the EDL will have an economic consequence for 
citizens, either directly to the individual pocket book or indirectly in the form of taxes, or 
inflation. States and the federal government, thus, must consider these consequences 
when deciding on a technological change that could impact thousands of U.S. citizens. 
Above these consequences is another concern, specifically, a huge multi-trillion dollar 
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and growing deficit. States too have similar overarching problems.249 Course corrections, 
thus, will not be joyful despite the convenience of a more secure driver’s license that 
offers more privacy. 
 Although adopting the encrypted short-range RFID or Smart Card solution is 
seemingly costly up front, there is the back-end cost of continuing with a program that 
leads to a dead end when, for example, several states have already denied and/or placed 
restrictions on the current technical solution for the EDL.250 In also does not make much 
sense to continue funding a program that can be subverted easily by counterfeits. More 
importantly, a course correction in the future will be more politically and economically 
costly. 
 The impact to commerce, trade, and tourism is another factor. The Canadian 
government, for example, has already complained of a “thickening” of the border as a 
consequence of the WHTI, reporting a roughly 30-percent drop in trade between the 
United States due to wait times at the border.251 The EDL is not, as of late, the big player 
and as such, a change to technology to a voluntary program should be minimal. If the 
program is taken a step further to upgrade REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses and to 
eliminate the WHTI, however, this factor is worth considering, particularly the time it 
takes to reach out a window. 
C. REAL ID LIMITATIONS ASSESSMENT 
The two major limitations identified for the current REAL ID complaint driver’s 
license were the lack of a design standard for driver’s licenses and an increased 
likelihood of counterfeiting as a result of state-wide improvements to the driver’s license 
acquisition process as a result of REAL ID. With an encrypted short-range RFID or 
Smart Card solution, both of these issues are addressed. Both offer a quick, secure, more  
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private, and, thus, more practical means of authenticating IDs that are more difficult to 
counterfeit and minimally impact commerce. Both limitations, thus, are addressed while 
improving national security and individual privacy.  
D. TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
The EDL, as designed, has qualities that make it a unique ID beyond the unique 
RFID numbers it loosely emits. In fact, it is far more unique than any of the other WHTI 
border control documents—PASS card, SENTRI, FAST, NEXUS, Global Entry—as it 
supplants the staple ID U.S. citizens use to prove their identity in numerous settings. This 
versatility further increases the value of the EDL to terrorists beyond other WHTI IDs as 
well as the REAL ID compliant driver’s license. The uniqueness calls for special 
attention to security. 
 Although REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses alone are susceptible to 
counterfeiting, EDLs are more susceptible as a result of placing “Enhanced” on driver’s 
license. The belief will be that intelligence, law enforcement, and other agencies will be 
less suspicious of someone with an EDL because of the implied security features. 
Without encryption and no authentication currently conducted beyond land and sea 
borders (a reason to minimize the number of border IDs types and increase authentication 
checks whenever and wherever possible), EDLs are more vulnerable. 
EDLs are also more vulnerable as a result of their read range. In fact, long read-
range on an ID has little, if anything, to do with security and will require 
countermeasures (driver’s license plate recognition technology at borders, protective 
sleeve, additional authentication). Long-range RFID, thus, produces vulnerabilities if on a 
common and multiuse ID. Warriors down range who carry driver’s licenses in their 
pocket, for example, could be “targeted” for an improvised explosive device (IED) 
attack. Similarly, political leaders, corporate titans, and other high-value targets could be 
vulnerable to targeting. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, adversaries will exploit 




The following are the key reasons for an encrypted short-range and/or Smart Card 
solution: 
• The EDL is a multiuse document often carried on person, used regularly, 
and not specific to border security. Like an e-passport, it is an extremely 
valuable ID to clone and counterfeit. 
• The EDL’s RFID serial numbers and TID serial numbers are more easily 
cloned by malicious readers without encryption, which increase the 
likelihood of counterfeiting. 
• The EDL’s long read range and multiuse nature, combined with pocket 
sleeve vulnerably, increases the likelihood of cloning and counterfeiting 
and other vulnerabilities. 
To be effective by all measures, the encrypted short-range RFID and/or Smart 
Card solution must protect the unique serial numbers from such clandestine activities as 
cloning, skimming, tracking, and profiling. Further, the technology should be 
authenticable, otherwise, there is no need to go beyond what REAL ID has, or continues, 
to accomplish. Specifically, the EDL program should be suspended if a secure solution(s) 
is not adopted. 
Some have suggested that the EDL, as currently equipped, could be given with an 
off and on switch, which alleviates some of the privacy concerns and/or threats from 
RFID technology away from the border.252 Yet, the on/off solution only addresses some 
of the privacy issues and not the security issues; the solution is still not encrypted. Thus, 
it would not make economic sense to pursue this course of action. The on/off switch, 
however, could be a plausible solution for border specific IDs with long-range RFID, 
notably those that are not multipurpose and necessary for national security. 
E. PRIVACY ASSESSMENT 
 Border control is a critical component of national security, yet so too are the 
ideals the border protects. Because obtaining the EDL is currently voluntary, the EDL 
must accord a level of privacy that is commensurate with the Fourth Amendment. In light 
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of a need for identification, the following are considered the key reasons for increase 
privacy protections: 
• The EDL is more vulnerable to the threats associated with RFID due to its 
multiuse, which “increases an individual’s likelihood of suffering 
dignitary harms as well as monetary or physical harms.”253  
• The EDL’s RFID serial number and TID serial number more easily 
skimmed as a result of having long read-range and no encryption, which 
increase privacy threats to U.S. citizens. 
• The EDL’s privacy protection measures—protective sleeve, privacy 
awareness training—are inadequate to protect a multiuse driver’s license. 
The counter-argument for additional privacy protections also invokes the EDLs 
voluntary nature: Citizens can choose convenience over privacy. Critics may also argue 
that cell phones are just as or more susceptible, which they are.254 A cell phone, however, 
can be turned off and battery removed to make it untrackable; of course, a cell phone is 
not required for “official purposes.” Importantly, voluntary EDLs do not take into 
account the erosion of privacy implied in this relationship; erosion at the bottom of the 
mountain will lead to landslides that eventually destroy the mountain. The convenience 
and slightly cheaper cost, in fact, fuels the erosion process by incentivizing U.S. citizens 
to cash in their privacy. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rooted in cost savings and convenience, the voluntary EDL, as currently 
equipped, cannot be justified under the rubric of national security. Other IDs—SENTRI 
card, FAST card, NEXUS card, PASS Card, Global Entry, and the U.S. passport—that 
are specific to border security could supplant the EDL with little, if any, long-term impact 
to commerce, trade, or tourism. In fact, there is little need for IDs beyond the e-passport 
and one WHTI card that identifies privileges. The recommendation, thus, is to begin 
reducing the number of WHTI IDs to increase authentication of a core ID, which 
decreases the likelihood of counterfeiting and increases the ability to detect visual 
anomalies. The core ID recommended: the EDL equipped with an encrypted short-range 
RFID or Smart Card technology. 
Although the current unencrypted long-range EDL does more accurately reflect 
identity than REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses, the technological solution does not 
account for the multiuse nature of a driver’s license. Attached to a multiuse ID that is 
carried on person often and exposed regularly for proof of identity increases the threats of 
cloning, tracking, skimming, and profiling by malicious readers. As a voluntary ID, these 
threats are not justifiable under the umbrella of national security and increase other 
vulnerabilities. Further, incentives—money, power, influence, subverting security, etc.—
are greater on a multiuse ID and as such, security measures must be commensurate. The 
recommendation, thus, is to adopt an encrypted short-range RFID or Smart Card solution 
to secure the EDL. 
Similarly, the unencrypted long-range voluntary EDL does not adequately protect 
privacy and will increasingly contribute to a societal erosion of privacy. Attached to a 
multiuse ID that is carried on person often and exposed regularly for proof of identity it 
increases the threats of tracking, skimming serial numbers to understand individual 
predilections, identity theft, and profiling by malicious readers. As a voluntary ID, again, 
these threats are not justifiable under the umbrella of national security. Although much is 
contingent on ingenuity, such as generating reasons for individual’s to pull their EDL out 
of the protective sleeve or increasing malicious reader power output to increase read 
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range, the threats are greater than the benefits the voluntary EDL offers. Further, the 
current technology is a barrier to full EDL acceptance. 
Adopting an encrypted short-range RFID or a Smart Card solution or both for the 
purpose of upgrading REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses that lack adequate Level 1 
and 2 counterfeit protections provides the national security justification for the EDL 
program. Irrespective, the new solution(s) safeguards the right to privacy and as such, the 
program could also remain voluntary in support of the WHTI with a long-term outlook. 
Short economic expense; adoption is a win-win-win for the federal government, states, 
and U.S. citizens with the following benefits: 
• New solution(s) reduces the ability to counterfeit a driver’s license. 
• New solution(s) decreases the likelihood of identity theft. 
• New solution(s) reduces threats to Fourth Amendment privacy, especially 
if other long-range RFID IDs in support of WHTI are reduced or 
eliminated as a result. 
• New solution(s) reduces system level threats to further security and 
privacy. 
• New solution(s) allows biometrics to be stored on ID, if necessary, in the 
future. 
• New solution(s) in-line with the Tenth Amendment or more 
fundamentally, the principles of federalism; EDL also remains state 
designed. 
• New solution(s) utilizes “pull” option, which eliminates the need to mirror 
PII in two government databases. 
• New solution(s) increases capabilities to states, particularly the ability to 
more securely store PII on a driver’s license. 
• New solution(s) reduces collation of PII in a federal database in support of 
the WHTI and thus, reduces national ID fears. 
• New solution(s) is friendlier to the First Amendment as it reduces the need 
to mandate one biometric and reduces the “chilling effect” of long-range 
RFID. 
• New solution(s) allows unfettered land, sea, and approved air border 
crossings with a driver’s license that can still remain “optional” for that 
purpose. 
• New solution(s) offers interoperability, speed, and precision, thus, are 
more practical in the field for ensuring security and commerce. 
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• New solution(s) increases public safety. 
The question is where to begin. The first recommendation is to suspend the EDL 
program until a new solution(s) is adopted. Suspending the program will ensure funds are 
not spent unnecessarily. EDLs that are in service should be recalled. Risk analysis, 
however, may produce an alternative course of action; that is, the current EDLs may fade 
away, alleviating pressure on individual pocketbooks. If risk is accepted, EDLs that 
remain in circulation must be closely examined; aging of the EDL will increase the 
demand. Once a technical solution(s) is decided upon, the voluntary program should be 
reinitiated while seeking nationwide acceptance to seize the long-term benefits of a 
REAL EDL. New EDLs must be distinguishable from old EDLs if allowed to remain in 
circulation. 
Congress must also enact federal legislation on the permissible uses of RFID for 
human IDs. The threats of RFID technology should not be pushed to the states, 
particularly when RFID technology is employed to support human ID initiatives by the 
federal government. 
This thesis has advanced an argument that the EDL, after adopting the appropriate 
technology, represents less of an impact on the First Amendment, the Fourth 
Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. Furthermore, it decreases the ability to 
counterfeit driver’s license that is commensurate with acquisition hardening, decreases 
the potential for identity theft, increases interoperability to facilitate both security and 
commerce, holistically increases national security, decreases threats to individual privacy, 
reduces system level threats, and returns freedoms to U.S. citizens such as having the 
option to cross borders with a driver’s license. 
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